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ARTICLES
STRUCTURAL  CHANGE
IN  STATE  POSTCONVICTION  REVIEW
Lee Kovarsky*
INTRODUCTION
Sandwiched between a state criminal trial and a federal habeas corpus
proceeding is a lesser-known phase of criminal process called “state postcon-
viction review” (“State PCR”).  Whereas trials and federal habeas process have
been lavished with centuries of legal attention,1 State PCR is a younger phe-
nomenon that has persisted in what one might call a state of malign neglect.
There is no federal right to a state postconviction lawyer2 because there is no
federal right to state postconviction process at all.3  Until recently, State PCR
was a phase of criminal process that federal institutions (if not scholarship)4
© 2017 Lee Kovarsky.  Individuals and nonprofit institutions may reproduce and
distribute copies of this Article in any format at or below cost, for educational purposes, so
long as each copy identifies the authors, provides a citation to the Notre Dame Law Review,
and includes this provision in the copyright notice.
* Professor of Law, University of Maryland School of Law.  For their insightful
comments, I thank John Blevins, Zack Bray, Adam Gershowitz, Brandon Garrett, Nancy
King, Leah Litman, and Eve Primus.  I am also grateful for the opportunity to participate
in the University of Maryland Legal Theory Workshop.  Finally, I appreciate the excellent
research assistance of Reagan Greenberg and Emily Levy.  All errors are my own.
1 See Vicki C. Jackson, Constitutional Law in an Age of Proportionality, 124 YALE L.J. 3094,
3107–08 (2015) (discussing the influence of Magna Carta and the English Bill of Rights on
early American legal artifacts); Amanda L. Tyler, The Forgotten Core Meaning of the Suspension
Clause, 125 HARV. L. REV. 901, 927 (2012) (explaining the influence of Blackstone and
Coke on founding-era understanding of habeas corpus).
2 Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 752 (1991).
3 See Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 557 (1987); see also Dist. Attorney’s Office v.
Osborne, 557 U.S. 52, 69 (2009) (citing Finley for the proposition that the constraints on
states providing postconviction relief are relaxed because they do not have to provide it);
Lackawanna Cty. Dist. Attorney v. Coss, 532 U.S. 394, 402 (2001) (explaining that there is
“no constitutional mandate” that states provide State PCR).
4 I do not mean to suggest that nobody has paid attention to State PCR at all.  There
is, for example, a recent treatise on state postconviction remedies. See DONALD E. WILKES,
STATE POSTCONVICTION REMEDIES AND RELIEF HANDBOOK (2013).  Particularly after the
Supreme Court decided Finley, more law review articles began to treat State PCR as a mean-
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virtually ignored.  Without federal intervention, it languished as an
underfunded afterthought.
State PCR is a backwater no longer.  The major structural changes lurk-
ing beneath the surface of American criminal punishment continue to
undermine the premise that a meaningful “day in court” takes place in a
single proceeding.  Instead, a commitment to reliability increasingly entails
effective collateral process, and the most potent doses of that process are
available in state court.  The growing need for postconviction review com-
bines with restrictions on the federal habeas remedy to create hydraulic pres-
sure on State PCR.  Federal institutions have responded with “interventions”
designed specifically to reinforce State PCR’s burgeoning enforcement port-
folio.  My objectives in this Article are to model the effect of structural
change on state postconviction remedies, to make sense of and evaluate the
responsive federal intervention, and by extension to understand the role that
State PCR will play in modern criminal process.
In Part I, I orient readers to the basic function and criticism of State
PCR.  For many years, State PCR was primarily a forum for relitigating consti-
tutional challenges that were or could have been pressed in the “direct-review
chain,” by which I mean on appellate (rather than collateral) review of the
conviction and sentence.5  To the extent that collateral proceedings were
necessary to vindicate constitutional rights, the federal habeas remedy did
the heavy lifting.  Federal courts were a robust backstop for dysfunctional
State PCR process, which was vulnerable to criticism on two major grounds.
First, states devoted inadequate resources to their State PCR.6  Second, state
collateral process could be hostile to Supreme Court decisions announcing
new constitutional restrictions on criminal punishment.7  Notwithstanding
these serious problems, the robustness of the federal habeas remedy allevi-
ated the need for federal institutions to intervene in State PCR.  The consti-
ingful object of study. See, e.g., Eric M. Freedman, Giarratano Is a Scarecrow: The Right to
Counsel in State Capital Postconviction Proceedings, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 1079, 1080–81 (2006)
(disputing relevance of Supreme Court decision refusing a right to counsel in capital State
PCR cases); Mary C. Hutton, Retroactivity in the States: The Impact of Teague v. Lane on State
Postconviction Remedies, 44 ALA. L. REV. 421, 424 (1993) (exploring how State PCR ought to
give effect to new Supreme Court rules).  In the last several years, however, some scholars
have begun to devote more attention to State PCR. See, e.g., Eric M. Freedman, State Post-
Conviction Remedies in the Next Fifteen Years: How Synergy Between the State and Federal Govern-
ments Can Improve the Criminal Justice System Nationally, 24 FED. SENT’G REP. 298, 298 (2012)
(arguing that several factors give state and federal governments a shared interest in proce-
durally sound State PCR); Nancy J. King, Enforcing Effective Assistance After Martinez, 122
YALE L.J. 2428, 2451–55 (2013) (considering how recent Supreme Court decisions about
the availability of federal habeas relief will affect state postconviction remedies); Justin F.
Marceau, Challenging the Habeas Process Rather than the Result, 69 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 85
(2012) (considering how 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 ought to be used to
target serious defects in State PCR).
5 See CAROL S. STEIKER & JORDAN M. STEIKER, COURTING DEATH 202–03 (2016).
6 See infra Section I.B.
7 See infra Section I.C.
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tutional rights of state inmates could be effectively enforced using a
combination of direct appellate and federal habeas review.
In the last twenty years, however, the landscape has changed dramati-
cally.  In Part II, I provide a structural explanation for the growing institu-
tional focus on State PCR: prominent constitutional defects may be
discovered only after a conviction becomes final,8 the Supreme Court
increasingly announces new and retroactive decisions requiring a postconvic-
tion forum,9 changes in forensic science might locate the most reliable evi-
dence of innocence outside the trial record,10 and adverse state
postconviction outcomes have become virtually impossible to contest in fed-
eral habeas proceedings.11  Because constitutional rules of newer vintage are
less capable of being enforced effectively in the direct-review chain, a viable
collateral forum is a growing imperative.  At the same time, waves of federal
habeas restrictions have all but eliminated federal courts from the collateral
enforcement equation.  The result is the emergence, by necessity, of State
PCR as a crucial forum for enforcing federal law.  In economic phrasing,
demand for collateral process is rising at the same time that federal supply is
falling.
Federal institutions have begun to use interventions to regulate State
PCR, which is emerging as the only forum capable of enforcing a broad swath
of constitutional law.  In Part III, I provide a framework for understanding
that intervention, which I subdivide into three forms.  First, the Supreme
Court has used “constitutional-law intervention” to constitutionalize small
pockets of State PCR, thereby allowing itself to enforce those rules on appel-
late review of state postconviction dispositions. Second, federal institutions
have increasingly attempted “habeas intervention” as a regulatory means of
incentivizing the structural hygiene of State PCR—attention to the quality of
representation and process in those proceedings.  Third, federal institutions
use “resource intervention” to siphon sources earmarked for federal habeas
proceedings to state postconviction litigation.
In Part IV, I show that, as a descriptive matter, federal interventions pri-
marily (but not always) conform to what one might call “Substantive-Con-
straint Exceptionalism”—an emphasis on substantive punishment
restrictions, particularly Eighth Amendment proportionality rules.  Substan-
tive-Constraint Exceptionalism is the exclusive focus of constitutional-law
intervention.  The other forms of intervention are more likely to involve pro-
cedural constraints, but embody a phenomenon that I call “dispersed enforce-
ment,” whereby lower federal judges—rather than the Supreme Court—
become the primary enforcement agents.
In Part V, I argue that, although such Substantive-Constraint Exception-
alism is the practiced reality of federal intervention, the Supreme Court’s
early attempts to justify it as something beyond an administrative necessity
8 See infra subsection II.A.1.
9 See infra subsection II.A.2.
10 See infra subsection II.A.4.
11 See infra Section II.B.
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remain largely unpersuasive.  Substantive constraints touch very few cases,
and the per-case social cost of resolving such claims is law.  Exceptionalism
might be easy to administer, but it lacks an elegant conceptual justification.
The Supreme Court’s pro-Exceptionalism narrative appears in Montgomery v.
Louisiana,12 a 2016 case holding that the Federal Constitution requires states
to apply federal retroactivity laws in their own postconviction proceedings.13
Montgomery is a touch radical in this respect, and the Exceptionalist narrative
it contains strongly suggests the difficult-to-defend proposition that a convic-
tion and sentence remain “lawful” as long as the contaminating error is
procedural.
My ultimate objectives are to diagnose, predict, and evaluate structural
change in State PCR.  Because claims and evidence necessary to enforce con-
stitutional rights increasingly require a meaningful collateral forum, and
because the federal collateral forum is so limited, State PCR is, for lack of a
better term, the Last Man Standing.  That status is not lost on the Supreme
Court and lower federal judges, who are adapting available legal rules to try
to improve the efficacy of collateral process in state court.  And such adapta-
tion does add to the bite of criminal-process rights, the underenforcement of
which is perceived as a major blemish on American penal practice.  What
remains lacking, however, is a more satisfying theoretical explanation for the
changes.
I. PROBLEMS IN STATE PCR
Notwithstanding how prominently it now figures in the administration
of criminal punishment, State PCR largely operates below the broader legal
community’s awareness threshold.  Most discourse instead centers on federal
postconviction process—i.e., habeas corpus proceedings.14  Before convicted
inmates file their federal habeas petitions, however, they must exhaust reme-
dies in State PCR.15  Almost every inmate interested in collaterally challeng-
ing a state conviction will encounter the state postconviction apparatus.
State PCR is therefore a primary device by which the Federal Constitu-
tion is enforced.16  Because of this function, federal institutions “intervene”
in order to prevent underenforcement of specific constitutional guarantees.
Left to develop on its own, however, State PCR fails to perform the enforce-
ment function adequately, so searing criticism of State PCR is easy to find.17
12 136 S. Ct. 718 (2016).
13 See id. at 732.
14 But see supra note 4 (reciting recent academic articles focusing on State PCR).
15 See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b) (2012).
16 State PCR is also, for example: (1) an important vehicle for enforcing features of
state law and (2) a process by which states address local problems in criminal justice
administration.
17 See, e.g., King, supra note 4, at 2442–46 (noting the dearth of legal representation in
State PCR); Eve Brensike Primus, Federal Review of State Criminal Convictions: A Structural
Approach to Adequacy Doctrine, 116 MICH. L. REV. 75, 77 (2017) (“At the state level, modern
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\93-2\NDL201.txt unknown Seq: 5 28-DEC-17 9:53
2017] structural  change  in  state  postconviction  review 447
In Part I, I briefly familiarize readers with the historical function of State PCR
and the chronic problems afflicting it.
A. The Paradigm Use of State PCR
At a criminal trial, a court adjudicates the guilt of a defendant, subject to
various parameters imposed by law.  Defendants can enforce those legal con-
straints at trial or on appellate review thereof—i.e., in the direct-review chain.
As with any other type of judgment, legal regimes prefer that constitutional
challenges to convictions and sentences be litigated in the direct-review chain
rather than collaterally.  After a defendant is convicted, however, collateral
process does afford her a postconviction forum.  Because of a federal exhaus-
tion requirement, collateral litigation begins with State PCR and concludes
with federal habeas corpus proceedings.18  Figure 1 represents the sequence





















FIGURE 1: THE STAGES OF CRIMINAL PROCESS
A collateral allegation that a conviction (or sentence) violates federal law
is called a “claim.”  At least in the minds of the legal institutions making
postconviction law during the infancy of State PCR, most collateral claims
represented attempts to litigate issues that the inmate either waived or failed
to win in the direct-review chain.19  For that reason, many states have laws
barring their courts from collaterally entertaining claims that were or could
postconviction review schemes are often so complicated and confusing that indigent crimi-
nal defendants have no realistic prospect of complying with the procedural rules.”).
18 The current version of the exhaustion requirement appears in 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254(b)(1)(A).
19 See STEIKER & STEIKER, supra note 5, at 202–03.
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have been resolved at some prior phase of the criminal process.20  Chal-
lenges requiring a collateral forum for competent litigation were more
exception than rule.  Federal institutions then developed legal principles
conforming to the familiar scenario—for example, that the Constitution
does not require State PCR at all,21 that there is no constitutional or statutory
right to counsel for any State PCR process,22 and that extreme deference was
due to all State PCR determinations.23  These one-size-fits-all rules followed
naturally from the view that the federal interests at stake were small and
undifferentiated.  State PCR was regarded generally as a redundant forum
for relitigating certain claims that could have been litigated in the direct-
review chain or other claims that could be entertained on federal habeas
review.
B. Resources and Counsel
State PCR is globally afflicted by resource scarcity,24 which manifests in a
spectacular failure to guarantee effective legal representation.25  Some
access-to-counsel issues are typical of any legal process dominated by indigent
litigants,26 but others flicker conspicuously as failures unique to State PCR.
The bottom line is that there are extraordinary structural barriers to effective
counsel during state postconviction proceedings.  In some respects, each
state has its own story,27 but access to counsel is impaired by some phenom-
ena common across jurisdictions.
Roughly eighty percent of prosecutions involve indigent defendants.28
In state postconviction litigation involving capital inmates, every jurisdiction
other than Alabama and Georgia requires that counsel be appointed.29  In
20 See, e.g., Parker v. Dugger, 550 So. 2d 459, 460 (Fla. 1989) (per curiam) (rejecting
appellate paradigm for postconviction review); Leonard v. Commonwealth, 279 S.W.3d
151, 156 (Ky. 2009) (same); Carter v. Galetka, 44 P.3d 626, 630 (Utah 2001) (same).
21 See supra note 3.
22 Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 752 (1991). But see infra Section III.B
(explaining how some resources earmarked for federal habeas process might be used to
support State PCR litigation).
23 See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (barring federal relitigation unless state decision is either
legally or factually unreasonable); Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 101 (2011) (equat-
ing unreasonableness with a “no fairminded jurist” standard).
24 See Bryan A. Stevenson, Confronting Mass Imprisonment and Restoring Fairness to Collat-
eral Review of Criminal Cases, 41 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 339, 342–45 (2006).
25 See Eve Brensike Primus, Structural Reform in Criminal Defense: Relocating Ineffective
Assistance of Counsel Claims, 92 CORNELL L. REV. 679 (2007).
26 See, e.g., Paul T. Crane, Charging on the Margin, 57 WM. & MARY L. REV. 775, 825–27
(2016) (discussing effect of resource scarcity on indigent misdemeanor defendants).
27 See King, supra note 4, at 2442.
28 See Mary Sue Backus & Paul Marcus, The Right to Counsel in Criminal Cases, A National
Crisis, 57 HASTINGS L.J. 1031, 1034 (2006).
29 See AM. BAR ASS’N, EVALUATING FAIRNESS AND ACCURACY IN STATE DEATH PENALTY
SYSTEMS: THE ALABAMA DEATH PENALTY ASSESSMENT REPORT 159 (2006), http://
www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/moratorium/assessmentproject/ala-
bama/report.authcheckdam.pdf; AM. BAR ASS’N, State Standards for Appointment of Counsel in
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noncapital postconviction cases, however, a lawyer is appointed for some-
where in the neighborhood of ten to twenty-five percent of state inmates.30
The remaining seventy-five to ninety percent litigate pro se.
The quality of legal representation, even for those inmates lucky enough
to have an appointed lawyer, remains atrocious.31  Most reflexively assume
that State PCR is handled by the same public defender entities that handle
trial proceedings in criminal cases.  That assumption is incorrect.  First, pub-
lic defender entities managing a litigation portfolio across phases of criminal
process will direct resources to the phases with the best returns: trials and
appeals.32  Second, even if a public defender office were inclined to maintain
a state postconviction presence, their role in the trial phase frequently dis-
qualifies them.  Difficult ethical questions arise when a public defender office
must assert a Sixth Amendment ineffective-assistance-of-counsel (IAC) claim
against itself—thereby attacking its own attorneys—so it ordinarily will not
provide postconviction representation when its own trial assistance is at
issue.33
For these reasons, the only situation in which a public defender can
effectively represent inmates in State PCR is when the office focuses exclu-
sively on that phase of the proceedings.  Some states have defender entities
specializing in State PCR, but they almost always focus on capital cases.
Texas, for example, has the Office of Capital and Forensic Writs (OCFW),
but it has had a narrow mandate limited to the first round of State PCR for
death-sentenced inmates.34  Moreover, capital cases account for a tiny frac-
tion of all felony cases, even in capitally active states.35  In the grand scheme
of State PCR, public defender organizations are actually capable of shoulder-
ing only a small fraction of the necessary litigation.
In the vast majority of cases where state courts appoint counsel that is
not a public defender office, the appointee will be a private attorney, some-
times from a panel.36  These lawyers are paid almost nothing, severely limit-
Capital Cases, ABA Death Penalty Representation Project (Feb. 2009); Am. Bar Ass’n, Evalu-
ating Fairness and Accuracy in State Death Penalty Systems: The Georgia Death Penalty Assessment
Report 155 (Jan. 2006), https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/mora-
torium/assessmentproject/georgia/report.authcheckdam.pdf.
30 See King, supra note 4, at 2444.
31 See John H. Blume, AEDPA: The “Hype” and the “Bite,” 91 CORNELL L. REV. 259, 276
n.97 (2006).
32 See King, supra note 4, at 2453–54.
33 See Giovanna Shay & Christopher Lasch, Initiating a New Constitutional Dialogue: The
Increased Importance Under AEDPA of Seeking Certiorari from Judgments of State Courts, 50 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 211, 255–56 (2008).
34 See TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 78.054 (West 2017) (describing authority of the office).
35 See, e.g., Thomas P. Sullivan, Efforts to Improve the Illinois Capital Punishment System:
Worth the Cost?, 41 U. RICH. L. REV. 935, 968 (2007) (estimating two percent for Illinois,
which has since discontinued capital sentencing).
36 See Eve Brensike Primus, Culture as a Structural Problem in Indigent Defense, 100 MINN.
L. REV. 1769, 1773 (2016).
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ing the pool of attorneys even willing to accept appointments.37  Miniscule
flat-fee arrangements create perverse incentives dissuading the appointees
from investing sufficient time in each case.38  These appointed attorneys can
be deeply unqualified for state postconviction representation.  In some juris-
dictions, judges make unsupervised appointments to newly minted lawyers,
anticipating that they will learn by trial and error on the state postconviction
docket.39  In short, even in cases where state postconviction lawyers are
appointed, massive structural impediments to quality representation remain.
Part of the problem involves how costs for postconviction representation
are shared between counties and the state.  County judges confronted with
appointment-of-counsel decisions effectively administer a budget for which
they are electorally accountable, and postconviction expenditures are never
popular.40  Nor do these local officials tend to suffer politically when a federal
court orders a retrial,41 so there is simply no internalized incentive for those
officials to make unpopular expenditures to avoid that outcome.  For those
inclined to the law and economics explanation, the situation is a classic pris-
oner’s dilemma.
Under-resourced state postconviction representation has dire conse-
quences for enforcement of federal rights.  Inadequate lawyers fail to per-
form investigation necessary to effectively litigate claims that require it.42
They lack economic incentives to learn basic rules of state postconviction
practice.  They tend to be unfamiliar with available constitutional claims and
the limits on litigation thereof.43  The result is that many federal rights go
unenforced, disappearing into State PCR without meaningful guarantees of
adequate legal representation.
37 See, e.g., Donald J. Harris et al., Dispatch and Delay: Post Conviction Relief Act Litigation
in Non-Capital Cases, 41 DUQ. L. REV. 467, 482 (2003) (explaining why more experienced
lawyers avoid State PCR appointments); David Rudovsky, Gideon and the Effective Assistance
of Counsel: The Rhetoric and the Reality, 32 LAW & INEQ. 371, 401 n.152 (2014) (describing the
need for federal intervention “necessitated by the lack of qualified and properly compen-
sated defense counsel in the [Pennsylvania] state appointment system”).
38 See Bruce A. Green, Criminal Neglect: Indigent Defense from a Legal Ethics Perspective, 52
EMORY L.J. 1169, 1179 (2003).
39 See King, supra note 4, at 2443.
40 See id. at 2453 n.91; Daniel S. Medwed, Up the River Without a Procedure: Innocent
Prisoners and Newly Discovered Non-DNA Evidence in State Courts, 47 ARIZ. L. REV. 655, 706
(2005).
41 See King, supra note 4, at 2452; see also Adam M. Gershowitz, Pay Now, Execute Later:
Why Counties Should Be Required to Post a Bond to Seek the Death Penalty, 41 U. RICH. L. REV.
861, 866 (2007) (suggesting system in which counties have to internalize more costs of
retrials).
42 See Blume, supra note 31 (detailing examples for death-sentenced inmates).
43 See Stephen B. Bright, Legal Representation for the Poor: Can Society Afford This Much
Injustice?, 75 MO. L. REV. 683, 690 (2010).
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C. Hostility to Federal Rules of Decision
The resource-driven impediments to adequate state postconviction rep-
resentation are the dominant problems for state inmates alleging violations
of federal law.  A secondary issue precipitating federal intervention is under-
lying hostility to federal rules of decision—that is, to rules of federal law that
constrain criminal adjudication in the states.44  Even though the distinction
between faithful and subversive application can be in the eye of the beholder,
hostility to federal decision rules is particularly evident in state decisions that
pare back the effects of substantive rules.  (It is present in the application of
procedural rules, but the examples require too much doctrinal background
for the space I have here.)  In cases where the Supreme Court has declared a
category of inmates ineligible for a particular punishment, some states have
laws that consistently restrict the scope of the exemption.45
The first way hostility to federal law is expressed is through narrowing
interpretations of the substantive rule itself.  In jurisdictions that have been
historically solicitous of the death penalty, for example, state institutions have
interstitially defined capital punishment exemptions in very restrictive ways.
Two examples of this phenomenon involve insanity and intellectual disability
(mental retardation).
The aftermath of Ford v. Wainwright,46 which barred the execution of
incompetent (insane) offenders,47 is an example of how some states tried to
limit an Eighth Amendment exemption by stringently defining it.  The Ford
plurality opinion left “to the State the task of developing appropriate ways to
enforce the constitutional restriction upon its execution of sentences.”48
Seizing on this language, which appears to contemplate procedure, several
states claimed license to adopt narrow definitions of incompetence.49  In
Panetti v. Quarterman,50 the Supreme Court ultimately rejected the attempts
of several states—states that for two decades had cited the deferential lan-
guage from Ford—to restrictively define incompetency.51 Panetti also
rejected state attempts, invoking the deferential Ford language, to exclude
broader procedural protections specified in Justice Powell’s Ford
concurrence.52
After Atkins v. Virginia established that intellectual disability (ID, for-
merly “mental retardation”) precluded a death sentence,53 some states
44 See STEIKER & STEIKER, supra note 5, at 127.
45 See infra notes 46–61 and accompanying text.
46 477 U.S. 399 (1986).
47 Id. at 409–10.
48 Id. at 416–17 (plurality opinion) (footnote omitted).
49 See, e.g., Barnard v. Collins, 13 F.3d 871, 876 (5th Cir. 1994) (reciting “awareness”
standard for competency that was subsequently overturned in Panetti).
50 551 U.S. 930 (2007).
51 See id. at 959.
52 See id. at 948–49.
53 See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002).
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attempted to define that exemption narrowly.54 Atkins contained the same
deferential nod that Ford included: “As was our approach in Ford . . . ‘we leave
to the State[s] the task of developing appropriate ways to enforce the consti-
tutional restriction upon [their] execution of sentences.’”55  Invoking that
deferential language, some states restrictively defined ID—by, for example,
imposing stringent IQ cutoffs and adaptive functioning rules inconsistent
with clinical ID criteria.56  After a dozen years, in Hall v. Florida,57 the
Supreme Court rejected the IQ cutoff as overstepping the procedural delega-
tion Atkins made to the states,58 and it recently issued an even more full-
throated endorsement of the idea that Atkins should adhere to clinical rules
in Moore v. Texas.59
Some states resist federal rules of decision not by attempting to define
the interstices of the substantive rule, but through state procedure.  In Mont-
gomery v. Louisiana,60 for example, the state invoked its power to restrict rem-
edies as a way around retroactive application of the Eighth Amendment
prohibition against sentencing juveniles to life without parole (LWOP).61
The use of procedure to resist unwelcome substantive law is not always detect-
able, and the Supreme Court may be in a position to correct it only when
such resistance crystallizes in a particularly visible rule.  For this reason, less
visible procedural resistance is a particularly difficult problem to address
through the federal intervention to which I turn shortly.
*  *  *
Given that it is afflicted by chronic resource shortages, and that it oper-
ates through voter-facing judges responsive to electorates that can be hostile
to collaterally applied rules, it should be unsurprising that State PCR subop-
timally enforced constitutional law in many jurisdictions.  For reasons I
explain in Part II, however, the downside of underenforcement was limited
when the collaterally enforced rights were less consequential, and when there
was a federal forum readily available to correct mistakes.  In light of struc-
tural change, however, the comfort of such checks is rapidly disappearing.
The stakes could not be higher—individual rights are only meaningful when
they are capable of being enforced, and states are not all that good at ensur-
ing that their PCR performs that function.
54 See STEIKER & STEIKER, supra note 5, at 127–28 (discussing example in Texas).
55 Atkins, 536 U.S. at 317 (second and third alterations in original) (internal citation
omitted) (quoting Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 416–17 (1986) (plurality opinion)).
56 See Hall v. Florida, 134 S. Ct. 1986, 2004 nn.4–5 (2014) (Alito, J., dissenting).
57 134 S. Ct. 1986.
58 Id. at 1990.
59 137 S. Ct. 1039, 1044 (2017).
60 136 S. Ct. 718 (2016).
61 See id. at 727.
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II. STRUCTURAL CHANGE
The problems afflicting State PCR are increasingly consequential, espe-
cially in light of two broad categories of structural change.  First, disposition
of crucial substantive questions increasingly requires reference to informa-
tion outside the trial record,62 thereby requiring a collateral proceeding.
Second, the declining availability of federal habeas relief means that State
PCR is usually the only collateral forum in which federal law is capable of
being meaningfully enforced.63  These two phenomena produce a hydraulic
effect through which the increased emphasis on collateral litigation is routed
from federal habeas proceedings to State PCR.
A. Substantive Changes
State PCR is becoming more and more important in part because of the
explosion of substantive legal questions requiring reference to information
necessarily outside the trial record.64  Questions incapable of resolution in
the direct-review chain require some sort of collateral forum, lest they assume
the status of recognized-but-unenforced rights.  Specifically, a claim requir-
ing a collateral state forum might now belong to four different categories: a
nontrial right accruing after a conviction becomes final,65 a new trial right
announced after a conviction becomes final,66 an extant trial right nonethe-
less incapable of being enforced by reference to the trial record,67 or new
evidence of innocence.68
In the course of explaining one phenomenon elevating the importance
of State PCR, then, Section II.A also represents a typology of sorts.  The four
claim categories specified above explain the growing need for a postconvic-
tion forum, but they also meaningfully differentiate the function that such a
forum might need to perform.  Claim categories might have similarities with
others, but they differ in important ways—for example, in terms of the need
for counsel, the resource intensiveness of litigation, or the likelihood of prior
consideration.
1. Nontrial Rights Accruing After a Conviction Becomes Final
In the process of imposing criminal punishment, state and federal courts
enforce a familiar panoply of trial rights: to a lawyer,69 to confront wit-
nesses,70 to a speedy trial,71 against the admission of involuntary confes-
62 See infra Section II.A.
63 See infra Section II.B.
64 This dynamic actually siphons litigation to postconviction process more generally.
65 See infra subsection II.A.1.
66 See infra subsection II.A.2.
67 See infra subsection II.A.3.
68 See infra subsection II.A.4.
69 See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984).
70 See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 68–69 (2004).
71 See United States v. Ewell, 383 U.S. 116, 120 (1966).
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sions,72 and so forth.  Even if there are practical challenges to enforcement
in the direct-review chain, when they are collaterally enforced they still
remain trial rights—constraints on state activity during trial.  Not every claim
asserted during postconviction review, however, involves a trial right.  Certain
rights ripen only after direct review of a conviction concludes, and only then
does the underlying constitutional error take place.  These nontrial rights
attach primarily in death penalty cases involving an inmate that becomes
unsuitable for execution.
The only recognized claim in this category is a challenge to execution
competency under Ford v. Wainwright73 and Panetti v. Quarterman.74  A so-
called Ford claimant asserts that, despite a permissible death verdict, the state
cannot execute him because he has dropped below a threshold of sanity.75
The category could eventually include an as-yet-unrecognized “Lackey”
claim—that the period between the death sentence and the execution is suf-
ficiently large that an execution would violate the Eighth Amendment.76
(Lackey theories lurk on the outskirts of auxiliary opinions in various
Supreme Court cases,77 although the Supreme Court has never taken the
issue by the horns.)  Whatever the theoretical composition of the nontrial
right set, it remains small for now.
Nontrial rights differ from collaterally enforced trial rights in very
important ways.  For these nontrial rights, there is no theoretical possibility of
direct-review enforcement because there is no right to enforce.  Nor is there
the possibility that an inmate would have had a prior right to counsel or
resources to explore and factually develop the claim.  Finally, the compli-
cated retroactivity framework designed to restrict litigation over Supreme
Court decisions postdating the conviction (discussed below) is an awful fit for
any claim that necessarily arises after the conviction becomes final.78
2. Trial Rights Announced After a Conviction Becomes Final
The second claim category consists of trial rights—but trial rights that
the Supreme Court recognizes after direct review of the conviction concludes.
For such rights, the term “collateral review” can be a little misleading,
72 See Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315, 324 (1959).
73 477 U.S. 399 (1986).
74 551 U.S. 930 (2007).
75 See id. at 949.
76 The claim inherits its name from an opinion respecting the denial of certiorari in
Lackey v. Texas, 514 U.S. 1045 (1995) (Stevens, J., memorandum respecting denial of
certiorari).
77 See, e.g., Boyer v. Davis, 136 S. Ct. 1446, 1447 (2016) (Breyer, J., dissenting from
denial of certiorari); Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726, 2756 (2015) (Breyer, J., dissenting);
Valle v. Florida, 564 U.S. 1067, 1067 (2011) (Breyer, J., dissenting from denial of stay);
Thompson v. McNeil, 556 U.S. 1114, 1114–15 (2009) (Stevens, J., statement respecting
denial of certiorari); Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35, 78–81 (2008) (Stevens, J., concurring in the
judgment); Knight v. Florida, 528 U.S. 990, 993 (1999) (Breyer, J., dissenting from denial
of certiorari).
78 See infra notes 80–87 and accompanying text.
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because the claim was not recognized when litigation in the direct-review
chain was pending.  For example, the state may not sentence a juvenile
offender to mandatory life without parole (LWOP), but that Eighth Amend-
ment rule was not announced until 2012, in Miller v. Alabama.79  If Miller is to
run in favor of juvenile offenders receiving mandatory LWOP prior to 2012,
then there must be a postconviction forum capable of retroactively enforcing
the trial right.
Most new constitutional rules do not run in favor of inmates whose con-
victions are final, because collateral litigation is barred by a principle of “non-
retroactivity”—the idea that the rules apply to prospective conduct.80  A
judicial decision is retroactive only if it applies to inmates whose convictions
are final and for whom direct review is finished.81
The modern rule is one of nonretroactivity for any case not pending on
direct review, with two exceptions: (1) some new rule of substantive law that
prohibits criminal punishment of certain activity, or that prohibits a certain
type of punishment for a certain type of offense; or (2) a “watershed” rule of
criminal procedure.82  There have been a number of decisions falling in the
first category,83 but the second is a null set.84  (The Supreme Court has indi-
cated that a felony defendant’s right to a lawyer would have qualified,85 but
Gideon v. Wainwright86 was decided before the arrival of the modern retroac-
tivity framework.87)  For claims asserting an exception, there must be some
postconviction forum in which to seek relief.
79 567 U.S. 460 (2012).
80 Questions about retroactivity in criminal proceedings are merely a subcategory of
long-standing questions involving retroactive application of any legal rule. See generally
Richard H. Fallon, Jr. & Daniel J. Meltzer, New Law, Non-Retroactivity, and Constitutional
Remedies, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1731 (1991) (arguing that the implementing doctrine for retro-
activity principles should come from the law of constitutional remedies); Jill E. Fisch, Retro-
activity and Legal Change: An Equilibrium Approach, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1055 (1997) (using
destabilization model to suggest appropriate levels of retroactivity); Louis Kaplow, An Eco-
nomic Analysis of Legal Transitions, 99 HARV. L. REV. 509, 511–12 (1986) (connecting retro-
active application of judicial decisions with other contexts in which the scope of retroactive
application must be determined).
81 See Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718, 728 (2016).  Hypertechnically, a deci-
sion is retroactive if it applies to any convictions pending on direct appeal, but a new
decision is always retroactive in that sense. See Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 304 (1989)
(plurality opinion).
82 See Beard v. Banks, 542 U.S. 406, 416–17 (2004).  The classic statement of the mod-
ern rule appears in Teague, 489 U.S. at 304 (plurality opinion).
83 See infra notes 88–93 and accompanying text.
84 See Dov Fox & Alex Stein, Constitutional Retroactivity in Criminal Procedure, 91 WASH.
L. REV. 463, 466 n.15 (2016) (collecting cases rejecting membership in second Teague
exception).
85 See Whorton v. Bockting, 549 U.S. 406, 419 (2007) (collecting Court cases referenc-
ing Gideon as paradigm of second Teague exception).
86 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
87 Gideon was decided in 1963, and Teague was decided in 1989.
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The most familiar types of retroactive rules involve the death penalty
and spring from the Eighth Amendment.  Under Atkins v. Virginia,88 the
state may not capitally punish people with intellectual disability (mental
retardation).89  Under Roper v. Simmons,90 the state may not capitally punish
offenders that were juveniles at the time they committed the murder in ques-
tion.91  Under Kennedy v. Louisiana,92 the state may not impose a death sen-
tence for any crime against the person that does not result in death.93  In
each of these cases, the Court used the Eighth Amendment to announce a
“proportionality rule” that barred capital punishment for certain categories
of offenders or offenses.  Even though proportionality jurisprudence has
been around for over a century,94 use of a more modern wholesale form—
which produces rules fitting into the first retroactivity exception—is a rela-
tively new phenomenon.95
3. Trial Rights Practically Incapable of Enforcement in Direct-Review
Chain
Postconviction proceedings are required to process certain claims that,
as a practical matter, are incapable of enforcement within the direct-review
chain.  Two examples should suffice to illustrate the scenario: one involving a
Sixth Amendment ineffective assistance of counsel (IAC) claim that trial
counsel was deficient and another involving a Fourteenth Amendment
“Brady” claim that the prosecution withheld exculpatory evidence.96
An IAC claim asserts a violation of the Sixth Amendment right to coun-
sel,97 which entails a right to effective assistance of counsel.98  Formally, the
elements of the claim are (1) deficient performance and (2) prejudice to the
trial outcome.99  In most situations where trial counsel is inadequate, the very
nature of the inadequacy prevents the construction of an appellate record
88 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
89 See id. at 321.
90 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
91 See id. at 578.
92 554 U.S. 407 (2008).
93 See id. at 413.
94 Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349 (1910), is generally considered the first propor-
tionality case. See Margaret Raymond, “No Fellow in American Legislation”: Weems v. United
States and the Doctrine of Proportionality, 30 VT. L. REV. 251, 252 (2006).
95 See supra notes 88–93 and accompanying text.
96 See generally Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) (specifying modern IAC
standard); Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) (announcing rule against prosecutorial
suppression of exculpatory and material evidence).
97 See U.S. CONST. amend VI; see also Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 342 (1963)
(incorporating an indigent criminal defendant’s right to appointed counsel against the
states).
98 See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 685–86.
99 Id. at 687; see also, e.g., Hinton v. Alabama, 134 S. Ct. 1081, 1087 (2014) (per
curiam) (describing as “straightforward” the two-prong IAC rule specified by Strickland).
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disclosing deficient performance and harm.100  Even in the limited situations
where the appellate record fully captures the inadequacy, there is another
barrier to IAC litigation: lawyers do not assert IAC claims against them-
selves.101  Unless a state has an elaborate procedural mechanism to allow a
new appellate lawyer to return a case to a trial court in order to consider and
build a record documenting the trial lawyer’s performance, there is virtually
no way to enforce the Sixth Amendment right in the direct review chain.
To make the Sixth Amendment example more concrete, consider a
common IAC scenario from a death penalty case.  Under Wiggins v. Smith,102
the Sixth Amendment entitles a capital defendant to an attorney that per-
forms an adequate “mitigation investigation.”103  Mitigating evidence demon-
strates reduced culpability and therefore bears on the appropriateness of a
capital sentence.  If trial and appellate counsel are the same person, the
problem is obvious.  That lawyer is not going to attack her own performance.
The problem persists even if the defendant can get a new lawyer on appeal.
In that scenario, the appellate record will not disclose what investigatory
leads trial counsel ignored (the deficiency prong) or what an adequate inves-
tigation would have disclosed (the prejudice prong).  Because a Wiggins
claim necessitates additional factual development, it is ordinarily incapable of
litigation within the direct-review chain and must be raised in postconviction
proceedings.104  The postconviction lawyer will have to identify information
trial counsel possessed but mishandled, and must conduct the omitted
investigation.
The second example involves a Fourteenth Amendment Brady violation,
which gets its name from Brady v. Maryland.105  A Brady claim asserts that the
prosecution suppressed evidence that was exculpatory and material.106  For
reasons that are perhaps more intuitive than in the IAC scenario, “Brady
material” is absent from the record on appeal. Brady material is often discov-
ered years (even decades) after trial and direct review conclude.107  A collat-
eral forum is necessary to introduce the suppressed evidence and to explore
the suppression’s effect on the ultimate outcome of the case.
Whatever the doctrinal intricacies, IAC and Brady claims do not involve
exotic factual scenarios.  The most thorough study of federal postconviction
cases to date reports that IAC claims were lodged by eighty-one percent of
capital inmates and fifty percent of noncapital inmates.108  Allegations that
100 See Primus, supra note 25, at 689.
101 See Eve Brensike Primus, Effective Trial Counsel After Martinez v. Ryan: Focusing on the
Adequacy of State Procedures, 122 YALE L.J. 2604, 2619 (2013).
102 539 U.S. 510 (2003).
103 See id. at 523.
104 See Samuel R. Wiseman, Habeas After Pinholster, 53 B.C. L. REV. 953, 989–90 (2012).
105 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
106 See id. at 87.
107 See Melanie D. Wilson, Anti-Justice, 81 TENN. L. REV. 699, 742 (2014).
108 See NANCY J. KING ET AL., NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, FINAL TECHNICAL REPORT:
HABEAS LITIGATION IN U.S. DISTRICT COURTS 28 (2007), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/
nij/grants/219559.pdf.
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the prosecution lost, failed to disclose, or presented false evidence were
lodged by forty-three percent of capital inmates and thirteen percent of non-
capital inmates.109  Of course, only a fraction of these claims are meritorious,
but they also make up the lion’s share of claims in which postconviction relief
is actually granted.  Moreover, both types of claims implicate the basic legiti-
macy of the criminal justice system.  IAC claims challenge the “bedrock”
guarantee of a competent lawyer,110 and Brady claims are a judicial check
against overzealous prosecution tactics that are increasingly understood as a
widespread structural problem.111  The guarantee of competent lawyers and
honest prosecutors are, along with impartial judges and representative juries,
the elemental normative commitments of American criminal process.
4. New Evidence of Innocence
The fourth phenomenon requiring a postconviction forum is not a cate-
gory of legal claims per se, but a category of evidence.  For much of human
history, evidence necessary to evaluate guilt degraded over time.  Eyewitness
memories faded, documentary evidence disappeared, and the exculpatory
value of changes in forensic science was limited.112  In cases where an
offender confessed, that confession was regarded as a virtually unimpeacha-
ble source of a guilt inference.113
Over the last twenty-five years, however, advances in forensic science
have radically altered how legal institutions use certain types of evidence.
Studies of exonerations in particular have exposed major flaws in the evi-
dence that juries traditionally used to infer guilt against defendants.114  False
confessions,115 erroneous eyewitness identification,116 unreliable infor-
mants,117 and junk science are the evidentiary categories most responsible
for wrongful convictions.118
109 See id. at 30.
110 See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984).
111 See Angela J. Davis, The American Prosecutor: Independence, Power, and the Threat of Tyr-
anny, 86 IOWA L. REV. 393, 432 (2001).
112 See Larry W. Yackle, The Habeas Hagioscope, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 2331, 2378 (1993).
113 See Richard A. Leo & Richard J. Ofshe, The Consequences of False Confessions: Depriva-
tions of Liberty and Miscarriages of Justice in the Age of Psychological Interrogation, 88 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 429, 492 (1998).
114 See, e.g., BARRY SCHECK ET AL., ACTUAL INNOCENCE: FIVE DAYS TO EXECUTION AND
OTHER DISPATCHES FROM THE WRONGLY CONVICTED app. 2 (2000) (first 62 DNA exonera-
tions); Brandon L. Garrett, Introduction: New England Law Review Symposium on “Convicting
the Innocent,” 46 NEW ENG. L. REV. 671 (2012) (analyzing first 250 DNA exonerees); Samuel
R. Gross et al., Exonerations in the United States 1989 Through 2003, 95 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOL-
OGY 523, 524 (2005) (first 340 exonerations, including 144 DNA exonerations).
115 See Brandon L. Garrett, Judging Innocence, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 55, 88–91 (2008).
116 See id. at 78–81.
117 See id. at 86–88.
118 See id. at 81–86.
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If the finality of criminal convictions is sacrosanct in part because of the
reliability of evidence produced in a trial forum,119 then at least two aspects
of the forensic-science revolution favor collateral litigation.  First, new DNA
information might be evidence of historical fact that is superior to anything
introduced at trial.  DNA evidence is capable of categorically excluding a per-
son as a source of biological material.120  In situations where the conviction
was secured before DNA evidence could be introduced at trial or where the
DNA evidence is for some other reason newly available, that exclusion can be
legally established only in a postconviction forum.
Second, as human knowledge evolves, categories of evidence that were
historically treated as strong indicators of guilt are exposed as less reliable.
Aggregated data from DNA exonerations, for example, performs a crucial
diagnostic function—it shows what types of evidence tended to produce
wrongful convictions.121  The empirical data has shown, for example, that
cross-racial eyewitness identifications are particularly unreliable.122  The data
has exposed similar overconfidence in confessions and jailhouse
informants.123
Legal regimes ordinarily disfavor relitigation of judgments—even crimi-
nal convictions—because of the interest in finality.124  Those regimes, how-
ever, do not promote that interest at all costs.  One interest particularly likely
to inspire maximal caution is the interest of human freedom at issue when
the contested judgment is a criminal conviction.125  If there is new DNA evi-
dence or if advances in human knowledge diagnose as unreliable categories
of evidence accounting for the conviction, then legal institutions will natu-
rally want to honor the truth-finding function of criminal process by facilitat-
ing collateral review.
Collateral litigation belonging to the innocence category differs signifi-
cantly from claims belonging to the others I specified previously.  Whereas
the impetus for providing collateral process in the other scenarios usually
involves the inability to make an argument at some prior point in the course
of capital litigation, innocence will have been litigated extensively within the
direct-review chain.126  Collateral litigation centered only on innocence does
119 See Brandon L. Garrett, DNA and Due Process, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 2919, 2921
(2010).
120 See generally Brandon L. Garrett, Claiming Innocence, 92 MINN. L. REV. 1629, 1652–99
(2008) (explaining role of DNA in criminal justice system).
121 See Lee Kovarsky, Justice Scalia’s Innocence Tetralogy, 101 MINN. L. REV. HEADNOTES 94,
103 (2016).
122 See generally Sheri Lynn Johnson, Cross-Racial Identification Errors in Criminal Cases, 69
CORNELL L. REV. 934 (1984) (presenting overarching discussion of cross-witness identifica-
tion issues in criminal cases).
123 See Garrett, supra note 115, at 88–91 (false confessions); id. at 86–88 (informants).
124 See Lee Kovarsky, Preclusion and Criminal Judgment, 92 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 637, 637
(2016).
125 See Judith Resnik, Tiers, 57 S. CAL. L. REV. 837, 843 (1984).
126 See supra notes 69–78 and accompanying text (claims of post-trial constitutional
error); supra notes 79–95 and accompanying text (claims of trial-right violations based on
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not so neatly implicate constitutional interests denominated as federal.
Instead, such relitigation requires reconsideration of guilt, which is at least
nominally considered at the core of state competence.
There are other features of innocence litigation that distinguish the col-
lateral process it requires from the process afforded to litigate claims in other
categories.  The underlying error is perhaps the most profound—a court has
criminally sentenced an offender that does not deserve punishment because
she did not commit the offense.127  But there is also a different ratio of
claim frequency to merit; innocence is almost certainly substantially over-
claimed.  In light of the altered calculus, federal institutions might want to
encourage a different balance of represented litigation, access to courts, fact
development, and finality than they do in the context of litigation involving
other categories.
B. Changes to Federal Habeas Law
The four structural phenomena discussed in Section II.A create demand
for postconviction process suited to slightly different needs, depending on
the claim category.  The phenomenon discussed in Section II.B, by contrast,
is about which postconviction forum fulfills that demand.  State PCR and federal
habeas proceedings are in some respects substitutes;128 they represent dis-
tinct collateral forums in which an inmate may challenge a state conviction.
When one forum becomes less efficacious, pressure mounts on the other.
For that reason, new restrictions on the federal habeas remedy are a source
of hydraulic pressure redirecting the critical collateral activity to state courts.
That pressure takes both substantive and procedural form.  First, 28
U.S.C. § 2254(d) imposes the substantive limit on relief, restricting federal
merits review only to cases in which no fairminded jurist could endorse a
state disposition against the claim.129  Second, federal lawmakers have cre-
ated an interlocking web of procedural barriers to relief, which have the
cumulative effect of making federal merits review largely inaccessible for state
inmates.  The cumulative effect of the substantive and procedural restrictions
on the federal habeas remedy—which some prominent scholars now call a
decisions announced after conviction is final); supra notes 96–111 and accompanying text
(claims of trial-right violations practically incapable of litigation in direct review chain).
127 See Barry Friedman, Failed Enterprise: The Supreme Court’s Habeas Reform, 83 CALIF. L.
REV. 485, 503–12 (1995) (arguing that the Supreme Court’s tepid embracement of federal
“actual innocence” doctrine has been poorly executed); Robert J. Smith, Recalibrating Con-
stitutional Innocence Protection, 87 WASH. L. REV. 139, 147–168 (2012) (arguing that inno-
cence is the “transcendent” value in criminal process).
128 They are also substitutes in a less colloquial, more economic sense—as the cost for
one rises, so too does demand for the other.
129 See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (2012).  I strongly dislike this term, but I do not dwell on my
terminological point here because the dispute is not central to this discussion. See
Kovarsky, supra note 124, at 668–69.
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“pipe dream”130—is to transform State PCR into the pivotal postconviction
forum.
1. Substantive Limits: 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)
There is a long running dispute about how deferential a court exercising
federal habeas jurisdiction should be towards a state disposition on a federal
claim—whether the claim was decided at trial, on appeal, or in State PCR.  In
1953, Brown v. Allen131 declared—or reaffirmed, depending on your point of
view—that the federal habeas statute permitted state inmates to obtain de
novo federal review of claims that had been decided on the merits in state
court.132  For several decades, state inmates could simply relitigate claims
lodged in federal habeas proceedings, even if such review was a second bite
at the apple.133  Speaking very generally, Brown embodied skepticism about
the capacity of state institutions to enforce federal rights,134 and conserva-
tives—who were generally more solicitous of state enforcement—sought to
roll Brown back.135  Those seeking to restrict habeas relief won considerable
victories from the Burger and Rehnquist Courts,136 and the insurgent
response eventually triumphed in the 104th Congress.
The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA),137
passed in response to the bombing of the Murrah Federal Building in
Oklahoma City, was loaded with statutory restrictions on federal habeas
130 Joseph L. Hoffmann & Nancy J. King, Essay, Rethinking the Federal Role in State Crimi-
nal Justice, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 791, 809 (2009).
131 344 U.S. 443 (1953).
132 See id. at 497–513 (opinion of Frankfurter, J.).  Justice Frankfurter’s opinion, which
was technically for the Court in the companion case of Daniels v. Allen, is generally consid-
ered controlling on the question presented in Brown as to the preclusive effect of a state
disposition. See BRANDON L. GARRETT & LEE KOVARSKY, FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS: EXECU-
TIVE DETENTION AND POST-CONVICTION LITIGATION 129 (2013); see also Lee Kovarsky, A Con-
stitutional Theory of Habeas Power, 99 VA. L. REV. 753, 800–02 (2013) (discussing conflicting
positions on precedent for Brown).
133 See Jordan Steiker, Restructuring Post-Conviction Review of Federal Constitutional Claims
Raised by State Prisoners: Confronting the New Face of Excessive Proceduralism, 1998 U. CHI. LEGAL
F. 315, 323.
134 See John C. Jeffries, Jr. & William J. Stuntz, Ineffective Assistance and Procedural Default
in Federal Habeas Corpus, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 679, 698 (1990).
135 Lee Kovarsky, AEDPA’s Wrecks: Comity, Finality, and Federalism, 82 TUL. L. REV. 443,
459–80 (2007).
136 See John H. Blume et al., In Defense of Noncapital Habeas: A Response to Hoffmann and
King, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 435, 440–41 (2011); see also, e.g., McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467,
493 (1991) (adopting “cause-and-prejudice” standard for any claim not included in a prior
federal habeas petition); Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 83, 87 (1977) (abandoning
“deliberate bypass” rule for excusing claims forfeited in state court, in favor of a more
difficult to satisfy standard of “cause and prejudice”); Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 481–82
(1976) (holding that Fourth Amendment claims were not cognizable on federal habeas
review).
137 Pub. L. No. 104-132, §§ 101–108, 110 Stat. 1214, 1217–26 (1996) (codified in rele-
vant part at 28 U.S.C. §§ 2244–2266 (2012)).
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review.138  The central AEDPA restriction is the substantive limit on relief,
which is now codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).139  Its significance transcends
habeas law, as it touches more generally on how state and federal institutions
share responsibility for enforcing constitutional obligations, the role of lower
federal courts in developing constitutional law, and how legal institutions
may limit remedies for constitutional violations.140
Analytically, § 2254(d) operates as a modified relitigation bar.  If there is
a state decision “on the merits” of a constitutional claim, then the relitigation
bar kicks in, and it can only be overcome if an inmate shows that the state
decision was either legally or factually unreasonable.141  Even before AEDPA,
courts exercising habeas jurisdiction had to defer to state fact-finding,142 so
§ 2254(d)(1)’s rule involving legal unreasonability was by far the more dra-
matic change from existing practice.
The first landmark § 2254(d)(1) case was Williams v. Taylor,143 in which
the Supreme Court rejected the idea that § 2254(d) permitted federal courts
to continue to decide constitutional claims simpliciter.  Instead, the Court
held that § 2254(d)(1) permitted federal merits consideration only if there
was a sufficiently grave legal defect in the state decision.144  A defect in the
state decision was only sufficient to disable the § 2254(d) relitigation bar, in
turn, if it was “objectively unreasonable.”145  The opinion did not define
“objective unreasonableness,”146 but it rejected the argument that a state
decision was objectively unreasonable only if “all reasonable jurists” would
consider it erroneous.147
Over the course of the last decade, the Supreme Court has ratcheted up
the standard considerably, thereby amplifying the hydraulic effect on State
PCR.  Specifically, it has adopted by another name the “no reasonable jurist”
138 See generally Lee Kovarsky, Death Ineligibility and Habeas Corpus, 95 CORNELL L. REV.
329, 335–42 (2010) (discussing effects of AEDPA on procedural restrictions).
139 See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).
140 Cf. Vicki C. Jackson, Introduction: Congressional Control of Jurisdiction and the Future of
the Federal Courts—Opposition, Agreement, and Hierarchy, 86 GEO. L.J. 2445, 2453–54 (1998)
(noting important questions sounding in “both jurisprudence and constitutional law”
(footnote omitted)).
141 Specifically, § 2254(d)’s preambular text states as the general rule that: “An applica-
tion for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment
of a State court shall not be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the
merits in State court proceedings unless . . . .”  28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (emphasis added).
142 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) required extensive deference to fact-finding before AEDPA. See
Stephen B. Bright & Patrick J. Keenan, Judges and the Politics of Death: Deciding Between the
Bill of Rights and the Next Election in Capital Cases, 75 B.U. L. REV. 759, 828 (1995) (discussing
the pre-AEDPA regime).
143 529 U.S. 362 (2000).
144 See id. at 409–10.
145 See id. at 409–14.
146 See id. at 409.
147 See id.
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standard that it rejected in Williams.148  Section 2254(d)(1) decisions now
routinely recite the rule that a state decision is not objectively unreasonable
unless every “fair-minded jurist” would disagree with it.149  The no-fair-
minded-jurist standard is a formidable obstacle to a state inmate seeking
relief, as a state respondent need only show that a reasonable jurist was capa-
ble of agreeing with the contested legal position.150
Because of the no-fairminded-jurist standard, federal habeas relief is
largely unavailable for claims previously decided on the merits in state
court.151  The hydraulic effect of § 2254(d) is unmistakable: an inmate
obtaining a state merits disposition does not get federal habeas review and
the state postconviction proceeding is, as they say, the ballgame.
2. Procedural Barriers to Relief
In addition to § 2254(d), there are many procedural barriers to federal
relief that turn on events in State PCR152: an exhaustion rule,153 a “procedu-
ral default” doctrine that bars consideration of claims forfeited in state
court,154 a statute of limitations,155 and severe constraints on the availability
of evidentiary hearings.156  First, § 2254(b) requires that state inmates
exhaust all state remedies before seeking federal habeas relief—effectively
forcing State PCR to the front of the postconviction sequence.  (Federal
courts can deny unmeritorious claims without waiting for exhaustion, but
cannot grant meritorious claims before exhaustion is complete.157)  The
exhaustion provision is only disabled if “there is an absence of available State
corrective process” or if “circumstances exist that render such process inef-
148 Compare Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 101 (2011) (equating unreasonableness
with the “no fair-minded jurist” standard), with Williams, 529 U.S. at 410 (rejecting the “all
reasonable jurists” standard).
149 See, e.g., Woods v. Etherton, 136 S. Ct. 1149, 1151 (2016) (per curiam) (citing
Richter formulation); Davis v. Ayala, 135 S. Ct. 2187, 2199 (2015) (same); White v. Woodall,
134 S. Ct. 1697, 1702 (2014) (same); Burt v. Titlow, 134 S. Ct. 10, 16 (2013) (same);
Nevada v. Jackson, 569 U.S. 505, 1992 (2013) (per curiam) (same); Wetzel v. Lambert, 565
U.S. 520, 524 (2012) (per curiam) (same); Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, 188 (2011)
(same). Richter incorporated a passing reference to disagreement among “fairminded
jurists” from Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 664 (2004).
150 Kovarsky, supra note 124, at 671.
151 See supra note 150 and accompanying text.
152 I do not discuss prominent procedural doctrines that do not turn on events occur-
ring during State PCR, such as the rules for so-called successive petitions. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 2244(b) (2012).
153 Id. § 2254(b).
154 See Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 735 (1991) (setting forth basic framework
of default doctrine).
155 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d).
156 Id. § 2254(e).
157 See id. § 2254(b)(2).
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fective to protect the rights of the [inmate],”158 but those exceptions are
almost never satisfied.159
Second, the “procedural default” doctrine generally bars federal habeas
relief on a claim that an inmate forfeited in state proceedings.160  If a state
court rules against an inmate on an adequate and independent state proce-
dural ground, then the federal courts are to give effect to the forfeiture and
are not to reach the merits of the claim unless the forfeiture is excused.161
Procedural default rules generally ensure that a state inmate must litigate a
claim in State PCR or lose it forever.
Third, AEDPA enacted a one-year statute of limitations that is statutorily
tolled only during the pendency of State PCR.162  There was no limitations
period before AEDPA,163 although some courts used laches to limit untimely
filing.164  The limitations period creates a temporal incentive to initiate State
PCR as soon as possible.  The pendency of State PCR is the only thing that
statutorily tolls the limitations period,165 so a failure to quickly seek state
remedies can create a disqualifying defect in a federal habeas claim.
Finally, there are major restrictions on fact development in federal
court.  An inmate seeking to avoid § 2254(d) may only use the state record—
there is no fact development available in federal habeas proceedings.166  Fact
development becomes available only after an inmate has cleared the relitiga-
tion bar.167  Even in scenarios where federal fact development is permitted,
new evidence and hearings are subject to substantial limitation.  Under
§ 2254(e)(1), state factual determinations are presumed correct and can be
reversed only upon clear and convincing evidence to the contrary.  Under
158 See id. § 2254(b)(1)(B).
159 Cf. HERTZ & LIEBMAN, FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 23.4
(7th ed. 2016) (setting forth caselaw under the exceptions).
160 See Johnson v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 1802, 1804 (2016) (per curiam); see also generally
HERTZ & LIEBMAN, supra note 159, § 26 (presenting the rules for procedural default and
exceptions thereto).
161 See Trevino v. Thaler, 133 S. Ct. 1911, 1917 (2013).  State inmates can excuse
defaults by showing either that failing to reach the claim is a miscarriage of justice or by
showing cause and prejudice. See House v. Bell, 547 U.S. 518, 536 (2006) (miscarriage of
justice); Edwards v. Carpenter, 529 U.S. 446, 451 (2000) (cause and prejudice).
162 See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2).
163 See Blume, supra note 31, at 288–89.
164 See Day v. McDonough, 547 U.S. 198, 214–15 (2006) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (discuss-
ing the relationship of laches to the limitations statute).
165 In Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631 (2010), the Supreme Court declared equitable
tolling available to state claimants, and held that deficient representation in State PCR
could theoretically disable the limitations period. See id. at 645, 652.
166 That an inmate must show § 2254(d)(2) factual unreasonableness by reference to
the state record flows from the plain language of the provision, which requires that the
reasonableness determination be made “in light of the evidence presented in the State
court proceeding.”  28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2).  In Cullen v. Pinholster, the Supreme Court
determined that an inmate must also show § 2254(d)(1) legal unreasonableness by refer-
ence to the state record.  563 U.S. 170, 180–81 (2011).
167 See Pinholster, 563 U.S. at 181–82.
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§ 2254(e)(2), federal hearings are unavailable for inmates that “failed to
develop” claims in state court, unless they meet either a new-law or a new-
fact-and-prejudice gateway.168  The upshot is that, even in cases where lim-
ited federal relitigation is permitted, inmates are basically restricted to the
factual record developed in State PCR.
These federal procedural rules reinforce the primacy of State PCR in the
postconviction sequence.  Exhaustion and procedural default rules combine
to ensure that states have the first crack at any issue capable of being decided
on the merits, the statute of limitations ensures that state inmates avail them-
selves of state remedies expeditiously, and an inability to supplement the
record in federal litigation means that most major fact development must
happen during state postconviction process.
III. INTERVENTION
The American legal experiment is one in which state courts must
enforce federal law,169 and state courts enforce federal laws that correspond
to federal interests.  One would therefore expect federal intervention in state
proceedings to follow logically from affected federal interests.  Indeed, when
State PCR was largely a forum for redundant legal challenge, or when federal
habeas process effectively secured the interests embodied in federal law, fed-
eral intervention in state PCR remained minimal.  Part II explained how
those conditions changed.
Part III provides a framework for mapping the corresponding adjust-
ment in federal intervention.  Different federal interests require different
federal responses, and three modes of intervention dominate: (1) constitu-
tional law constraining State PCR (constitutional-law intervention); (2) use of
federal habeas rules as incentives for states to improve representation and
other procedural features of State PCR (habeas intervention); and (3) sup-
plementation of resources for state postconviction litigation (resource
intervention).
One clarification is in order.  I exclude from scrutinized intervention the
scenario in which the Supreme Court directly superintends State PCR by
reviewing the underlying merits of a claim of trial right.  It is in some sense
true that, whenever the Court uses its power to hear and adjust the scope of
such a right—like the rights to effective counsel170 or to exculpatory evi-
dence in the prosecution’s possession171—it necessarily (if indirectly) dic-
tates the emphasis of state postconviction remedies.  I nevertheless exclude
such activity from the analysis because it regulates State PCR only inciden-
tally, as it adjusts enforcement of the underlying trial right across all phases
168 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2).
169 The Madisonian Compromise rendered lower federal courts optional, and federal
interests were secured through state adjudication that was subject to Supreme Court
review. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Jurisdiction-Stripping Reconsidered, 96 VA. L. REV. 1043,
1060 n.72 (2010).
170 See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984).
171 See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87, 90–91 (1963).
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of criminal and postconviction litigation.  In short, the object of the inquiry is
not to regulate the State PCR practices.  The interventions discussed below,
by contrast, are procedural rules specifically targeting enforcement during
State PCR, and are therefore the more appropriate subjects for inquiry into
the federal enforcement priorities for that phase of criminal process.
A. Constitutional-Law Intervention
The first mode of federal intervention is the most intuitive: rules
imposed by the Supreme Court when it undertakes appellate review of state
postconviction adjudication.  By “constitutional-law intervention,” I do not
mean the Supreme Court’s direct review of whether State PCR correctly
answered a question of constitutional error at trial, but intervention in which
the Supreme Court declares that a rule of constitutional law directly con-
strains State PCR itself.
Until recently, constitutional-law intervention was virtually nonexistent.
Only recently has the Supreme Court retreated from the basic premise of its
abstention: that there exists no right to any State PCR, so there cannot be
ancillary rights to things like lawyers and expert services.  Still, use of consti-
tutional-law intervention remains sparing, and its deployment signals an unu-
sual level of institutional interest.
1. Constitutional Right to State PCR Itself
The foundational assumption behind constitutional-law abstention is
that the Federal Constitution requires no State PCR at all.172  The logic says
that, if the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not estab-
lish a right of direct appeal, then, a fortiori, it cannot establish a right to state
postconviction process.173  Nor does the federal habeas privilege, guaranteed
against suspension in Article I, Section 9,174 require a state postconviction
forum.175  To the extent that constitutional law applies to State PCR, it usu-
ally constrains the operation of State PCR after a state has made a decision to
provide that process.176  That the Federal Constitution does not require State
172 See sources cited supra note 3.
173 See, e.g., United States v. MacCollom, 426 U.S. 317, 323 (1976) (plurality opinion)
(“The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment does not establish any right to an
appeal, and certainly does not establish any right to collaterally attack a final judgment of
conviction.” (citing Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 18 (1956) (plurality opinion))).
174 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2.
175 See Kovarsky, supra note 132, at 786–94 (documenting authority in support of the
proposition that federal habeas power does not, by force of the Suspension Clause, require
a state postconviction forum).
176 See, e.g., Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718, 731–32 (2016) (declaring that, if
states provide postconviction process, the Supremacy Clause requires that they use the
federal retroactivity framework).
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PCR recurs as an express premise of greater-includes-the-lesser holdings
denying other constitutional rights asserted during state collateral process.177
The only existing exception to the categorical rule that the Federal Con-
stitution requires no State PCR involves an inmate’s competency to be exe-
cuted.178  The Supreme Court first declared the Eighth Amendment
proportionality rule against executing insane offenders in Ford v. Wain-
wright.179  The (constitutional) rules for “execution competency” constrain
states based on an offender’s functioning at the time he is to be killed.  Exe-
cution-competency rules are distinct from rules about when an inmate is not
guilty by reason of insanity180 and is not competent to stand trial.181  Because
a death-sentenced inmate’s competency for execution is necessarily assessed
after trial (and usually long after trial), it can only take place in a postconvic-
tion proceeding.
Under Justice Powell’s Ford framework,182 advanced in a median concur-
rence but formally declared “‘clearly established’ law” in Panetti v. Quarter-
man,183 an inmate making a “substantial [ ] showing” of incompetency is
constitutionally entitled to a “fair hearing” and an “opportunity to be heard”
on the claim.184 Ford’s Eighth Amendment rule against executing insane
offenders is clear enough, but the auxiliary procedural rights—springing
from the due process clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments—are
more general.  States have enacted implementing statutes and,185 where nec-
essary, federal courts have particularized the rule in individual cases.186
177 See, e.g., Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 752 (1991) (denying a right to coun-
sel in State PCR on the ground that the Constitution does not require State PCR at all).
178 Of course, State PCR cannot be “fundamentally unjust” in the same way that any
state action cannot be arbitrary. See Dist. Attorney’s Office v. Osborne, 557 U.S. 52, 69
(2009).
179 477 U.S. 399, 410 (1986).
180 See generally Stephen J. Morse, Excusing the Crazy: The Insanity Defense Reconsidered, 58
S. CAL. L. REV. 777 (1985) (arguing in favor of retaining the insanity defense).
181 See Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 171 (1975) (“It has long been accepted that a
person whose mental condition is such that he lacks the capacity to understand the nature
and object of the proceedings against him, to consult with counsel, and to assist in prepar-
ing his defense may not be subjected to a trial.”).
182 A four-Justice plurality insisted that the Constitution required trial level safeguards,
but Justice Powell concurred separately to urge more modest procedural protection. Ford,
477 U.S. at 410–18 (plurality opinion).  Justice Powell’s view of the required Ford proce-
dure, id. at 418–31 (Powell, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment), was
generally regarded as controlling pursuant to the principle that, when there is no majority
opinion, the position of the median Justice can be treated as the opinion of the Court. See
Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977).
183 551 U.S. 930, 949 (2007).
184 Id. (quoting Ford, 477 U.S. at 424–26 (Powell, J., concurring in part and concurring
in the judgment)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
185 See, e.g., TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 46.05 (West 2017) (specifying procedure
for litigating Ford claims).
186 See, e.g., Panetti v. Stephens, 727 F.3d 398, 410 (5th Cir. 2013) (articulating test as a
“rational understanding” standard).
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The reason for the unique treatment of Ford claims is intuitive. Ford
claims do not ripen until a state sets an execution date.  If the Federal Consti-
tution is to be the source of any rules for Ford claims at all, then those rules
must regulate process afforded at the postconviction phase of the capital
litigation.
2. Constitutional Right to Counsel During State PCR
The Sixth Amendment entitles a criminal defendant to “the assistance of
counsel for his defence.”187  The Supreme Court gradually expanded the
reach of the Sixth Amendment right to an appointed lawyer—first to capital
defendants too impaired to defend themselves,188 then to all federal defend-
ants,189 then to any capital defendant irrespective of impairment,190 and, in
Gideon v. Wainwright,191 to any felony defendant in state or federal court.192
The Sixth Amendment right extends to any critical phase of the adversary
proceeding in the trial court, including the plea bargaining process.193  On
appeal, a convicted defendant has a due process and equal protection right
to an appointed lawyer in “first-tier review”—that is, in the first appellate
forum available for reviewing a particular determination.194  In State PCR,
however, the Supreme Court has not wavered in its refusal to recognize any
constitutional right to counsel.195  The most direct rejection of the possibility
was articulated in Pennsylvania v. Finley.196
Finley rejected both due process and equal protection theories for a right
to counsel.  On the due process question, the Supreme Court analogized to
Ross v. Moffitt,197 which held that fundamental fairness did not require provi-
sion of counsel to use “as a sword to upset the prior determination of
guilt.”198 Moffitt had explained that because a state need not provide appel-
late process at all, it need not provide a lawyer for whatever discretionary
appellate process it electively maintains.199  Using a familiar greater-includes-
lesser rationale, Finley explained that “[p]ostconviction relief is even further
removed from the criminal trial than is discretionary direct review,”200 and so
187 U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
188 See Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 73 (1932).
189 See Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 463 (1938).
190 See Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52, 54 (1961).
191 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
192 See id. at 343–44.
193 See Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 373 (2010).
194 See Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 356–58 (1963).
195 See infra notes 196–209.
196 481 U.S. 551, 555 (1987).  The Court had previously suggested, in Johnson v. Avery,
393 U.S. 483 (1969), that no constitutional right to postconviction counsel existed. See id.
at 488.
197 417 U.S. 600 (1974).
198 See Finley, 481 U.S. at 555 (citing Moffitt, 417 U.S. at 610–11).
199 See Moffitt, 417 U.S. at 602–11.
200 Finley, 481 U.S. at 556–57.
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the Court concluded that due process could not require a right to counsel in
State PCR.201
Finley also rejected a Fourteenth Amendment equal protection theory
that indigent inmates needed a right to counsel to have the same access to
courts as inmates of means,202 although such a rejection was a heavier lift.  In
Douglas v. California,203 the Supreme Court had used the Equal Protection
Clause to declare a constitutional right to appointed counsel in the first as-of-
right appeal.204  (The distinction between the as-of-right and discretionary
appeals explains the difference between Douglas and Moffitt.)  In Finley, how-
ever, the Court explained that withholding appointed counsel for discretion-
ary appeals or State PCR did not violate equal protection because the
inmate’s “access to the trial record and the appellate briefs and opinions
provided sufficient tools for the pro se litigant to gain meaningful access to
courts that possess a discretionary power of review.”205
The reasons Finley gave for categorically rejecting a postconviction right
to counsel no longer describes the category very well.  First, the premise that
no postconviction process is constitutionally required is now false.  The Con-
stitution requires that states provide process to consider content described in
subsection II.A.1: nontrial rights that accrue after a conviction becomes final.
Second, the premise that all unrepresented inmates can put themselves on
equal footing with inmates of means because they have access to the trial and
appellate records is also inaccurate.  For each of the four different functions
specified in Section II.A, inmates require extensive access to content outside
those records in order to enforce constitutional rights.
Notwithstanding the deteriorating accuracy of its assumptions, Finley has
been affirmed many times.206  The major attempt to subvert Finley involved
not the type of claim at issue, but the capital versus noncapital status of the
claimant.  In Murray v. Giarratano,207 however, the Supreme Court rejected
the proposition that a capitally sentenced inmate possessed a unique right to
state postconviction counsel.208 Giarratano failed to produce a majority opin-
ion, and the median vote came from Justice Kennedy, who was willing only to
say that there was no right-to-counsel violation on the facts before the
Court.209  As Finley and Giarratano are currently interpreted—and however
one might parse the Justice alignment in the latter—there is no constitu-
201 See id. at 556.
202 See id. at 557.
203 372 U.S. 353 (1963).
204 See id. at 357–58.
205 Finley, 481 U.S. at 557.
206 See, e.g., Williams v. Pennsylvania, 136 S. Ct. 1899, 1921 (2016) (“The postconviction
petitioner has no constitutional right to counsel.”); Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722,
752 (1991) (“There is no constitutional right to an attorney in state postconviction
proceedings.”).
207 492 U.S. 1 (1989) (plurality opinion).
208 See id. at 12–13.
209 See id. at 14–15 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment).
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tional right to counsel in State PCR, without respect to the function that
State PCR performs in a given case.210
3. The Applicability of Retroactivity Rules in State PCR
The newest intervention involves the Supreme Court’s 2016 decision to
apply federal retroactivity rules, by force of the Federal Constitution, during
State PCR.211  Understanding the significance of this particular constitu-
tional-law intervention requires some additional discussion of retroactivity
and basic familiarity with the potentially retroactive substantive rule.  As for
the rule: In Miller v. Alabama,212 the Court held that the Eighth and Four-
teenth Amendments precluded juveniles from receiving a mandatory sen-
tence of life without parole (LWOP).213 Miller naturally created a
retroactivity question: Should juvenile offenders serving a mandatory LWOP
when Miller was decided be able to invoke it to obtain a resentencing?
The framework from Teague v. Lane214 governs retroactivity questions in
federal habeas litigation.215  Supreme Court cases decided after a trial con-
cludes are classified as “old law” or “new law.”  “Old law” is treated as an
explanation of existing precedent and postconviction claimants may invoke
the later-in-time decision as a ground for relief.216  “New law” is treated as a
departure from precedent and is generally unavailable to inmates whose con-
victions are final,217 except in two situations: (1) when it announces a new
substantive rule that bars a finding of guilt or punishment for a particular
offense; and (2) when it is a “watershed” rule of procedure.218  The pressing
question was whether Miller fit within the first exception.
The Supreme Court took up Miller’s retroactivity in Montgomery v. Louisi-
ana.219  Even if Miller qualified as a new substantive rule for Teague purposes,
there was a lurking jurisdictional question about whether state courts had to
use the Teague framework at all.  On one view, in refusing to give retroactive
effect to Miller, Louisiana was simply applying a state limit on a nonmanda-
tory state remedy; the federal retroactivity framework was arguably irrele-
vant.220  Phrased in the black-letter jurisdictional language of federal-courts
jurisprudence, the state ground for refusing relief was independent of any fed-
210 See, e.g., Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470, 492–93 (2000) (Souter, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part) (explaining a predicament faced by state inmates because they
have “no right to counsel in state postconviction proceedings”).
211 See Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718, 729 (2016).
212 567 U.S. 460 (2012).
213 See id. at 465.
214 489 U.S. 288 (1989).
215 Part of Teague was only a plurality opinion, but it was subsequently adopted in toto.
Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 313 (1989), abrogated on other grounds by Atkins v. Virginia,
536 U.S. 304 (2002).
216 See Teague, 489 U.S. at 301 (plurality opinion).
217 See id. at 310.
218 See id. at 311.
219 136 S. Ct. 718 (2016).
220 See id. at 727.
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eral question221—because there was no federal law requiring Louisiana to
provide a retroactive remedy.222 Montgomery, however, declared that states
had to retroactively apply new substantive rules during their PCR.223  The
Court, however, refused to extend the rule beyond the new-substantive-law
category; it expressly reserved the question as to whether states had to give
retroactive effect to watershed rules and it did not address the need to give
retroactive effect to new precedent applying “old rules.”224 Montgomery is a
classic split-the-baby case that yields more questions than answers, but is to
date the Court’s most robust attempt to explain the substantive-law focus of
its State PCR intervention.
B. Habeas Intervention
Federal institutions use habeas intervention to encourage attention to
the quality of representation and process during State PCR.  Insofar as fed-
eral institutions can adjust the availability of federal habeas relief to reflect
the quality of State PCR, they can incentivize preferred state practices.
Indeed, because federal habeas incentives link the availability of a state’s
federal habeas defenses to the efficacy of judicial remedies it administers,
incentives create some dignitary and economic interest in good state post-
conviction hygiene.  The dignitary interest arises from the state’s preference
to avoid a finding that its postconviction outcome was in some way defective.
The economic interest arises from the state’s preference to avoid both merits
litigation in federal court (as a litigant) and any additional state proceedings
necessitated by federal relief (as an adjudicator).  As I explain below, how-
ever, these incentives are very muted and therefore represent the lowest-level
federal intervention.
Federal habeas relief was not always linked to state postconviction pro-
cess; for many years, federal judges reviewed constitutional claims de novo,
no matter what happened in state court.225  Eventually, starting in 1977, the
Burger Court began to modernize decisions linking state outcomes with the
availability of federal review.  The first major point on the modern trend line
was Wainwright v. Sykes,226 when the Court held that even blameless inmates
could not recover claims forfeited in state proceedings.227 Sykes was the pro-
totypical incentive—if state action caused the forfeiture, only then could the
state inmate excuse it.
221 See, e.g., Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1040–41 (1983) (setting forth modern
test and presumptions for independence inquiry).
222 In Montgomery itself, the parties agreed that the Supreme Court had appellate juris-
diction to decide the case, so the argument that the state ground was independent was
made by a Court-appointed amicus. See Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 727.
223 See id. at 731–32.
224 See id. at 729.
225 See A. Christopher Bryant, Retroactive Application of “New Rules” and the Antiterrorism
and Effective Death Penalty Act, 70 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1, 6–7 (2002).
226 433 U.S. 72 (1977).
227 See id. at 90–91.
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The concept of habeas incentives got a boost with the “Powell Commit-
tee Report,” the work product of a committee charged by then-Chief Justice
Rehnquist to study delays in the imposition of capital sentences.228  The
Committee ultimately concluded that a major cause of delay was the need for
capital inmates, not always represented by competent counsel, to bounce
back and forth between federal and state habeas proceedings to exhaust
claims.229  A considerable amount of responsibility for that state of affairs,
the Powell Committee determined, was attributable to inadequate represen-
tation during State PCR.230
The Powell Committee therefore recommended a legislative quid pro
quo for litigation initiated by capitally sentenced inmates: states guaranteeing
adequate State PCR would benefit from enhanced procedural defenses dur-
ing federal habeas proceedings.231  The Committee’s so-called “opt-in” rec-
ommendations found their way into federal legislation, but in an altered
form that mooted the habeas incentives.  When Congress passed AEDPA, it
incorporated the Committee recommendations alongside a set of more gen-
eral procedural restrictions applicable to both capital and noncapital cases—
and applied those restrictions without respect to adequate representation
during State PCR.232  Because the default restrictions were so favorable to
the states, none bothered to make changes necessary to avail themselves of
the opt-in mechanism.  The opt-in experience is emblematic of habeas incen-
tives generally, insofar as such incentives have done little to improve the
underlying resource and representation problems in State PCR.
The Supreme Court ultimately got into the habeas incentives game
when it remade procedural default doctrine to account for defects in state
postconviction representation.  Recall that in Sykes,233 the Supreme Court
held that an inmate could not excuse state forfeiture without a showing of
cause and prejudice.234  The Court thereafter settled on a general rule that
inadequate representation during State PCR was not sufficient to establish
the excuse.235  The rule was expressly built on the idea of agency—the pro-
fessional negligence of a state postconviction lawyer was charged to the
inmate, not to the government.236  The Court carved out a narrow exception
228 AD HOC COMM. ON FED. HABEAS CORPUS IN CAPITAL CASES, REPORT ON HABEAS
CORPUS IN CAPITAL CASES, reprinted in 45 CRIM. L. REP. (BNA) 3239 (Sept. 27, 1989).
229 See id.
230 See id. at 3240.
231 See Mark Tushnet & Larry Yackle, Symbolic Statutes and Real Laws: The Pathologies of the
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act and the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 47 DUKE L.J. 1,
31 (1997).
232 See Kovarsky, supra note 135, at 467.
233 Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977).
234 Id. at 87.
235 See Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 755 (1991).
236 See Davila v. Davis, 137 S. Ct. 2058, 2065 (2017) (describing Martinez as an exception
to the rule that “[a]ttorney error that does not violate the Constitution . . . is attributed to
the prisoner”).
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to that proposition when it decided Martinez v. Ryan in 2012.237  In Martinez,
the Court held that a federal court could entertain an otherwise defaulted
IAC claim if the default was the result of inadequate state postconviction
representation.238
Martinez is a window into the Supreme Court’s strategic deployment of
habeas incentives.  For an IAC claim—which must usually be raised for the
first time in a postconviction proceeding—the Court was willing to link state
representation during State PCR to the availability of the habeas remedy.
The incentive is straightforward: By promoting adequate state postconviction
representation, states avoid having to litigate claims on federal habeas review.
By failing to guarantee adequate state representation, they expose themselves
to incremental litigation risk.
The Supreme Court has created similar habeas incentives for other pro-
cedural defenses.  In Holland v. Florida,239 for example, it devised an incen-
tive related to the federal statute of limitations.240  Specifically, if a state
inmate files an otherwise untimely federal habeas petition because of serious
defects in state postconviction representation—albeit defects that are more
than mere negligence—the limitations period is equitably tolled and the
claim is not time-barred.241 Holland’s incentive structure is also straightfor-
ward.  In order to guarantee the availability of the federal limitations defense,
the state must provide counsel that does not commit professional
misconduct.
Across procedural doctrine—procedural default and the statute of limi-
tations—federal institutions have formulated habeas incentives as a means of
encouraging state focus on State PCR process and representation.  The one
area in which the Supreme Court has moved away from an incentives-based
approach is with respect to 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), the rule for state merits dis-
positions, discussed initially in subsection II.B.1.  Section 2254(d) requires
that when a state court decides the merits of a claim, federal habeas review
begins with the state decision and not with an assessment of the underlying
claim.  If the state decision is legally or factually unreasonable, only then may
the federal court consider the merits of the claim.  On its face, § 2254(d)
appears to draw a powerful link between reasonableness of state decisions
and the availability of federal relief.
The Supreme Court’s interpretation of § 2254(d), however, has sup-
pressed that linkage.  First, the Supreme Court has watered down the con-
cept of what it means to be “reasonable.”  As explained above, a state decision
237 See Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S. Ct. 1309, 1315 (2012).
238 Id.  In Maples v. Thomas, the Court held that attorney abandonment could excuse
forfeiture of any claim under the Sixth Amendment or under any other constitutional
provision.  132 S. Ct. 912, 927 (2012).
239 560 U.S. 631 (2010).
240 The federal limitations provision appears in 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d) (2012).
241 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2) provides for the tolling of the limitations period only for the
pendency of State PCR, but does not specify any condition under which failure to meet the
limitations provisions should be excused.
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is now considered legally unreasonable only if every “fair-minded jurist”
would reject it.242  In light of the no-fairminded-jurist standard, inmates face
almost insurmountable hurdles in showing that state merits dispositions are
legally unreasonable.  Second, in Harrington v. Richter,243 the Supreme Court
mooted what might have been an incentive for desirable state postconviction
process when it held that, for cases in which the state court produced no
reasoned opinion in support of the decision, a federal court could not reach
the merits of the underlying claim unless every conceivable line of reasoning
sustaining the decision was unreasonable.244  Third, in Cullen v. Pinholster,245
the Court determined that inmates subject to adverse state merits determina-
tions could not use evidence outside the state record to satisfy § 2254(d).246
Pinholster effectively locks inmates into the record produced during State
PCR, thereby entrenching any representational deficiency tainting that pro-
cess.  The decision is therefore of a piece with Richter and the no-fairminded-
jurist standard.  The Roberts Court has largely refused to use § 2254(d) as a
means of promoting transparent state postconviction process, notwithstand-
ing that one might defensibly interpret the plain language of the provision to
provide habeas incentives for writing opinions, using strong reasoning, and
facilitating fact development.
Habeas incentives also differ somewhat from other modes of interven-
tion in terms of orientation, at least insofar as the most recent innovations
appear preoccupied with the Sixth Amendment right to counsel rather than
with substantive constraints.  For reasons I ultimately set forth in Part IV,
however, that deviation is less than meets the eye.  Habeas incentives are, in
effect, a lower order intervention, and they are appearing largely in addition
to less apparent incentives already centered on Eighth Amendment substan-
tive constraints.
C. Resource Intervention
Federal institutions also intervene in State PCR, albeit indirectly,
through a process of statutory spillovers.  In such spillover intervention,
resources earmarked for federal habeas proceedings are used to support
state postconviction litigation.247  Because resource intervention is keyed to
242 See supra note 149 and accompanying text.
243 562 U.S. 86 (2011).
244 See id. at 98.
245 563 U.S. 170 (2011).
246 See id. at 181–82.
247 The spillover intervention is not limited to a subsidy for representation, but also
includes a subsidy for fact development.  For the small pocket of state postconviction litiga-
tion preceded by federal habeas litigation, there is a spillover from any investigation per-
formed during the federal habeas phase.  There is no way to “exclude” whatever
information counsel uncovers from use in the subsequent proceeding.  In economic par-
lance, as between the federal habeas and subsequent state postconviction phases, the infor-
mation is nonexcludable.  As a result, an inmate that develops a claim in federal court but
is told to return to state court to exhaust it may have benefitted from resources to fact
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the appointment of a federal habeas lawyer for an indigent federal habeas
claimant, the benefits are realized only in the small subset of state postconvic-
tion proceedings that follow the federal appointment.  Even then, resources
may be available only for discrete types of state postconviction litigation.
Resource intervention happens because some postconviction claimants
are indigent and may obtain, by statute, federal counsel and fact-development
resources—i.e., lawyers, investigators, and experts.248  The appointment
rules in State PCR vary by jurisdiction, but no state appoints lawyers for every
state postconviction litigant.  Even for inmates on death row, not every state
provides legal representation.249  Federal courts make appointments at the
beginning of federal habeas litigation.  Even though these appointments are
made in federal court, they may cover state representation occurring after
that appointment.  States are loath to appoint counsel in most cases, reason-
ing that the vast majority of state postconviction claims are nonmeritorious.
The federal resource statute for noncapital inmates provides that an
inmate with a federally appointed lawyer “shall be represented at every stage
of the proceedings . . . including ancillary matters appropriate to the pro-
ceedings.”250  18 U.S.C. § 3599(e), the provision specifically available to capi-
tal inmates, requires that the representation persist throughout “every
subsequent stage of available judicial proceedings,” for “all available post-con-
viction process,” and for “other appropriate motions and procedures.”251
Moreover, § 3599(e) contains multiple references to proceedings that, for
state inmates, must be outside the federal process, including “competency
proceedings” and “executive or other clemency.”252
The most prominent Supreme Court decision interpreting the federal
appointment provisions for capital inmates is Harbison v. Bell,253 in which the
Court determined that “executive or other clemency” included state clem-
ency provisions.254  The Court refused to read “subsequent stage[ ] of availa-
ble judicial proceedings” as statutory authorization for appointed counsel to
represent inmates in state postconviction proceedings, reasoning that, by vir-
tue of the exhaustion requirement, state postconviction proceedings were
development.  Indeed, such a subsidy appears in both the general and death-penalty provi-
sions.  The expert spillover is not particularly large, although it can be significant in situa-
tions where investigators uncover new claims while developing the federal record.
248 Under 18 U.S.C. § 3599 (2012), any inmate sentenced to death is entitled to an
appointed federal habeas lawyer.  Subsection 3599(f) entitles those inmates to investigative
resources that are “reasonably necessary” to the representation.  Under 18 U.S.C. § 3006A,
any inmate serving a noncapital sentence is entitled to CJA representation if a federal court
“determines that the interests of justice so require.”
249 See, e.g., Gibson v. Turpin, 513 S.E.2d 186, 189 (Ga. 1999) (rejecting argument that
capital inmate was entitled to state postconviction counsel); see also supra note 29 (docu-
menting absence of right to counsel in Alabama and Georgia).
250 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(c).
251 Id. § 3599(e).
252 Id.
253 556 U.S. 180 (2009).
254 Id. at 182–83.
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not a “subsequent” stage of process within the meaning of the statute.255  In
footnote seven, however, the Court held that, pursuant to § 3599(e)’s refer-
ence to representation for “other appropriate motions and procedures,” fed-
erally appointed habeas counsel may be required to exhaust claims
subsequent to the federal appointment on a “case-by-case” basis.256  After
Harbison, § 3599 appears to provide capitally sentenced state inmates with
federally appointed lawyers to litigate Ford claims, to seek clemency, and, in
certain cases, to exhaust claims.
The most important anomaly of resource intervention is therefore the
most basic: inmates having undertaken out-of-order litigation may have the
benefit of federal lawyers and investigative services when they return to state
court to exhaust a claim.  Inmates who appropriately exhaust claims, thereby
encountering State PCR before they make any contact with a federal court,
will not.
Resource intervention tracks almost nothing of functional significance.
It siphons resources to whatever state postconviction litigation happens to
follow the federal appointment.  By way of one example, the federal appoint-
ment covers state Ford litigation that follows the appointment, but not litiga-
tion over other death penalty exemptions, such as intellectual disability.257
By way of another, there is a provision permitting courts to make appoint-
ment of counsel for inmates serving noncapital sentences retroactive—and
therefore a means of compensating lawyers for state postconviction activity—
but not a provision doing the same for death-sentenced inmates.258
The arbitrariness of resource intervention persists in large part because
courts are caught between, on the one hand, the impulse to use the federal
statute to improve representation in State PCR and, on the other, the
unforgiving language in the federal statutory provisions that govern appoint-
ment of counsel in federal habeas cases.  Because resource intervention
affects only state process commencing after the federal appointment, the spil-
lover effect is limited largely to successive state postconviction litigation.259  If
one were to redirect federal resources from federal to state proceedings, a
utility-maximizing designer would siphon resources to State PCR that effec-
tively promote federal interests.  A regime that redirects federal resources to
255 Id. at 189–90.
256 Id. at 190 n.7.
257 See supra notes 53–59 and accompanying text.
258 Compare 18 U.S.C. § 3006(b) (2012) (noncapital inmate provision stating that the
“appointment may be made retroactive to include any representation furnished pursuant
to the plan prior to appointment”), with id. § 3599 (capital inmate provisions containing
no parallel rule).
259 Although reading the CJA statute to include such proceedings seems natural for the
language, few jurisdictions have actually done so.  Only the Fifth Circuit has unequivocally
stated that the federal appointment includes subsequent state representation. See Wilkins
v. Davis, 832 F.3d 547, 558 (5th Cir. 2016).
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\93-2\NDL201.txt unknown Seq: 35 28-DEC-17 9:53
2017] structural  change  in  state  postconviction  review 477
successive state postconviction litigation is moving those resources to perhaps
their lowest valued use.260
States often operate on the same principle that constrains federal habeas
proceedings—that inmates should have one bite at the apple.261  As a result,
successive state postconviction litigation is severely restricted.262  Relitigating
claims decided in some prior state postconviction proceeding is next to
impossible, and inmates generally have to meet strict exceptions to litigate
new claims.263  The cost to an inmate of enforcing rights in successive state
postconviction litigation, as opposed to initial state postconviction litigation,
is enormous.
Resource intervention therefore protects most effectively (if inadver-
tently) the narrow category of claims that I analyze in Part IV: substantive
constraints incapable of being enforced at trial.  The best example is the spe-
cial treatment reserved for Ford litigation over whether an inmate is compe-
tent for execution264—litigation that requires a successive state forum.
Enforcement of other restrictions on punishment that are new, substantive,
and retroactive will also require a successive state proceeding,265 because
such claims can usually be asserted only after the first round of State PCR
concludes.
*  *  *
Federal intervention occurs largely because State PCR underenforces
federal law.  Even though State PCR performs other functions, it is the appli-
cation of federal rules of decision—almost always constitutional law—that is
the primary concern of federal institutions.  Federal intervention takes the
three general forms that I describe here and, in light of the structural
changes explored in Part II, that intervention is accelerating.  The question
that interests me, and that I turn to now, is whether that intervention con-
forms to a meaningful pattern.
IV. DESCRIBING SUBSTANTIVE-CONSTRAINT EXCEPTIONALISM
In Part IV, I argue that federal intervention is best understood as a form
of Substantive-Constraint Exceptionalism—a paradigm under which a small
260 There are rare scenarios where considerable state postconviction litigation follows
the federal appointment.  For example, if an inmate files a “mixed petition” containing
exhausted claims, the federal proceeding will usually be stayed and held in abeyance to
permit the inmate to take the unexhausted claims back to state court. See Rhines v. Weber,
544 U.S. 269, 275 (2005).  Such stay-and-abeyance procedure increases the spillover effect.
261 See, e.g., Jackson v. State, 983 So. 2d 562, 573 (Fla. 2008) (reciting the one-bite-at-
the-apple principle); Ex parte Saenz, 491 S.W.3d 819, 824 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016) (same).
262 See Andrew Hammel, Diabolical Federalism: A Functional Critique and Proposed Recon-
struction of Death Penalty Federal Habeas, 39 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1, 11 (2002).
263 See id.
264 See Stewart v. Martinez-Villareal, 523 U.S. 637, 643 (1998).
265 By definition, a law is “new” if it is announced after a conviction, and a successive
proceeding will be necessary unless the initial postconviction litigation remains pending.
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category of “substantive” limits on conviction and punishment are singled out
for special treatment.  (I use the term “substantive-constraint” rather than
“Eighth Amendment” to modify Exceptionalism because the category is
slightly broader than a pure set of Eighth Amendment rules.)  Exceptionalism
has the imperfections of any explanatory theory, but it rather robustly
predicts the constitutional inflection of federal intervention.  The Exception-
alism is “transmodal” in that it operates across intervention categories, but is
most visible in the Supreme Court’s constitutional-law intervention.  The
Exceptionalism embedded in the other modes of intervention has softer
edges in that its priorities can include some procedural constraints.
The presence of those softer edges itself reveals a familiar pattern.
When intervention requires more active judicial supervision, the Supreme
Court shifts that enforcement role to lower federal judges.  The Court
reserves constitutional-law intervention for a narrow sliver of substantive-law
constraints, but enlists lower federal courts to enforce interventions that
touch more broadly applicable procedural constraints.  Put differently, inter-
ventions are more Exceptionalist when they require the Supreme Court to do
more of the enforcement work.  The dynamic by which lower federal courts
are effectively deputized to enforce nonsubstantive constraints is reminiscent
of the Supreme Court’s enforcement approach for trial rights announced
during the Warren Court’s criminal procedure revolution.266
A. The Concept of Substantive Constraint
The precise contours of what I mean by “substantive constraint” are not
self-evident, but what I mean by the term is this: a constraint is substantive if,
notwithstanding perfect procedure, it bars conviction or the imposition of
punishment based on attributes of the offender or offending conduct.  New
substantive constraints include new constitutional rules against conviction for
certain offenses, or new decisions excluding certain offense conduct from
the punitive coverage of a statute.  They also include new constitutional rules
against certain penalty-offense-offender combinations, or decisions that a
statute no longer permits such a combination that it previously permitted.
Because federal courts do not narrow state criminal statutes responsible
for state convictions and sentences, the category of “substantive constraints”
that are the subject of State PCR interventions are substantive constraints
imposed by the Federal Constitution.267  If a court invalidates a statute under
the First or Eighth Amendment, or as unconstitutionally vague, then state
inmates convicted and serving a voidable sentence will seek to invoke the
constraint in State PCR.  Two features make these new substantive constraints
266 See infra note 322.
267 Other types of substantive constraints come into play when federal interventions are
targeted at federal custody because they touch retroactivity principles adjudicated under
Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989)—including decisions that, as a matter of statutory
interpretation, narrow the applicability of a criminal statute. See Jason M. Zarrow & Wil-
liam H. Milliken, The Retroactivity of Substantive Rules to Cases on Collateral Review and the
AEDPA, with a Special Focus on Miller v. Alabama, 48 IND. L. REV. 931, 955 (2015).
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intuitive candidates for exceptional treatment by the federal institutions that
design interventions: (1) the claims are necessarily available only to the lim-
ited set of state inmates subject to the voided punishment and (2) the timing
of new substantive constraints necessitates clear rules for postconviction
enforcement.
Notwithstanding the theoretical scope of the term, the substantive con-
straints that federal institutions care most about are Eighth Amendment
“proportionality” rules.  Although I have referenced proportionality chal-
lenges throughout this Article, it is now worth pausing to explain their fea-
tures in a bit more detail.  As most lawyers know, the Eighth Amendment
contains the so-called Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause: “Excessive
bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual
punishments inflicted.”268  The Clause is, among other things, the source of
categorical rules against certain penalty-offense-offender combinations.  By
“proportionality” rules, I mean Supreme Court decisions declaring that the
Eighth Amendment forbids conviction or punishment for a particular crime
based on characteristics of the offense or the offender.269
The first major reference to “proportionality” in Eighth Amendment law
was in Weems v. United States.270 Weems was decided in 1910, when the
Supreme Court declared “it is a precept of justice that punishment for crime
should be graduated and proportioned to [the] offense.”271 Weems also fore-
shadowed the fluidity that would become a basic feature of proportionality
doctrine, declaring that the content of Eighth Amendment rules was “not
fastened to the obsolete but may acquire meaning as public opinion becomes
enlightened by a humane justice.”272  The Court cemented its commitment
to that fluidity in 1952, holding that a punishment was not proportional to a
crime if it violated “the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress
of a maturing society.”273
Even after the Supreme Court incorporated the Eighth Amendment and
its evolving-standards content against the states in 1962,274 proportionality
rules were spare.275  In Coker v. Georgia,276 the Court issued a proportionality
268 U.S. CONST. amend. VIII (emphasis added).
269 See generally John F. Stinneford, Rethinking Proportionality Under the Cruel and Unusual
Punishments Clause, 97 VA. L. REV. 899 (2011) (arguing, based on original meaning, that
proportionality is a constraint necessitated by retributivist limits on punishment).
270 217 U.S. 349 (1910).
271 Id. at 367.
272 Id. at 378.
273 Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958) (plurality opinion).
274 See Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 667–68 (1962).
275 See, e.g., Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 30–31 (2003) (plurality opinion)
(rejecting proportionality challenge to “three-strikes” sentencing); Harmelin v. Michigan,
501 U.S. 957, 994–96 (1991) (rejecting proportionality challenge to mandatory LWOP pos-
session of more than 650 grams of cocaine); Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 279–84, 303
(1983) (sustaining proportionality challenge to LWOP for a defendant’s seventh nonvio-
lent felony); Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 265 (1980) (rejecting proportionality chal-
lenge to “three-strikes” sentencing).
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rule against executing an offender who raped (but did not murder) an adult
woman.277  The first three decades of post-Coker precedent centered prima-
rily on death penalty cases,278 which naturally limited the set of offenders to
which the Eighth Amendment rules applied.279  For example, the number of
inmates facing the death penalty and with viable claims that they are intellec-
tually disabled under Atkins v. Virginia280 or insane under Ford v. Wain-
wright281 is only a subset of capitally sentenced offenders282—a subset that is
itself only a fraction of all offenders.  To the extent that the Court’s impor-
tant proportionality jurisprudence ventures beyond the death penalty, it
involves LWOP for juveniles,283 a sentence category that also entails natural
limits on the size of any potential claimant class.284  The important point is
that, as a percentage of convicted inmates, the number touched by Eighth
Amendment proportionality rules is small.
Another essential quality of proportionality claims—that after some
period of penal experimentation, a punishment drifts outside the commu-
nity’s punishment norms—means that the Eighth Amendment rule will be
announced while some inmates are actually subject to the newly forbidden
penalty-offense-offender combination.  There were intellectually disabled
offenders on death row when the Supreme Court decided Atkins,285 there
were juvenile offenders serving mandatory LWOP when it decided Miller,286
and so on and so forth.  As a result, any proportionality rule will present
pressing retroactivity questions for convicted inmates belonging to the verbo-
ten category.
B. Transmodality
Substantive-Constraint Exceptionalism operates transmodally—across
constitutional-law intervention, habeas intervention, and resource interven-
276 433 U.S. 584 (1977) (plurality opinion).
277 See id. at 592.
278 See supra notes 88–95 and accompanying text.
279 See Rachel E. Barkow, The Court of Life and Death: The Two Tracks of Constitutional
Sentencing Law and the Case for Uniformity, 107 MICH. L. REV. 1145, 1148 (2009).
280 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
281 477 U.S. 399 (1986).
282 Estimates of the fraction of death-row inmates with intellectual disability range
between four and twenty percent. See Peggy M. Tobolowsky, A Different Path Taken: Texas
Capital Offenders’ Post-Atkins Claims of Mental Retardation, 39 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 1, 143
(2011) (collecting authorities).  Between five and ten percent of death-row inmates have
severe mental illness sufficient to file a colorable Ford claim. See John H. Blume et al.,
Killing the Oblivious: An Empirical Study of Competency to Be Executed Litigation, 82 UMKC L.
REV. 335, 356 (2014).
283 See Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 465 (2012).
284 See Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 64 (2010) (“Thus, adding the individuals
counted by the study to those we have been able to locate independently, there are 123
juvenile nonhomicide offenders serving life without parole sentences.”).
285 Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
286 567 U.S. 460.
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tion.  The transmodality of the intervention is significant insofar as it reveals
a consistent emphasis on enforcing substantive constraints.  Moreover,
because the interventions are mutually reinforcing, they combine to form an
environment in which such constraints, and particularly Eighth Amendment
claims, enjoy a uniquely privileged litigation status.
I do not mean to suggest that each mode of intervention conforms per-
fectly to an Exceptionalism model.  Constitutional-law intervention does
focus, for all intents and purposes, exclusively on substantive constraints.
The other modes of intervention, however, have softer edges—which is to say
they do sometimes co-prioritize procedural constraints on convicting and
sentencing.
1. Exceptionalism in Constitutional-Law Intervention
The easiest-to-understand Exceptionalism is that which dominates con-
stitutional-law intervention.  Since the advent of State PCR, the Supreme
Court has repeatedly intoned the premise that the Federal Constitution does
not require the process at all.287  The constitutional law of State PCR has
been built, bolt by decisional bolt, around that foundational principle.  In
decisions turning back other constitutional rights,288 the Court regularly
relies upon the greater-includes-the-lesser proposition that, if the Federal
Constitution requires no State PCR, then it can require no other rights to
attach there.  The two major exceptions to this general constitutional absten-
tion strongly conform to the Exceptionalism model.
First, the only substantive constitutional rights that directly constrain
State PCR are built around an Eighth Amendment proportionality rule. Ford
v. Wainwright was the 1986 decision in which the Supreme Court announced
the rule against executing insane (incompetent) offenders.289 Panetti v.
Quarterman was the 2007 decision announcing a more precise definition of
competency290 and affirming that an inmate with a “substantial” Eighth
Amendment claim is entitled to a modicum of State PCR bootstrapped to a
determination that the underlying Ford claim has some merit.291  The only
clear candidate to be added to the list of constitutional rules constraining
state postconviction process is the so-called Lackey claim—also an Eighth
Amendment challenge—that the Constitution forbids states from executing
offenders that have spent too many years on death row.292
Second, Substantive-Constraint Exceptionalism explains a more com-
plex constitutional-law intervention: the 2016 rule from Montgomery v. Louisi-
ana,293 in which the Supreme Court held that the Federal Constitution requires
that states apply a decision retroactively if it announces a new rule of substan-
287 See sources collected supra note 3.
288 See Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 752 (1991).
289 477 U.S. 399, 401 (1986).
290 551 U.S. 930, 959–60 (2007).
291 See id. at 949–50.
292 See supra notes 76–77 and accompanying text.
293 136 S. Ct. 718 (2016).
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tive law.294  The vehicle for the decision was the Eighth Amendment propor-
tionality rule against imposing mandatory LWOP against juvenile
offenders,295 and that vehicle is no accident.
Montgomery nicely illustrates Substantive-Constraint Exceptionalism not
just because of what it is, but because of what it is not.  The preexisting retro-
activity framework required that federal courts apply new decisions retroac-
tively in two other contexts—when the new decision is “old law” that is
“dictated by precedent” and when it is “new law” that represents a “water-
shed” rule of procedure.296  In Montgomery, however, the Court explicitly
refused to require states to give retroactive effect to these other types of deci-
sions.  The result, then, is a special retroactivity carve-out applicable only to
substantive constraints.
2. Habeas Intervention
Substantive-Constraint Exceptionalism has its softest edges with respect
to habeas intervention, because habeas interventions consist of judge-made
doctrine that is less likely to focus exclusively on substantive constraints.
Insofar as Congress calibrates habeas incentives, it tends toward treatment that
lumps substantive and procedural constraints together.  The relitigation bar
in 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) does not operate differently depending on whether
the state merits adjudication involved an Eighth Amendment proportionality
claim or some other constitutional challenge.297  Moreover, virtually none of
the other federal claim-processing provisions pegged to state postconviction
process make any facial distinctions based on the type of claim presented.298
To the extent that there are priorities for habeas intervention, they tend
to find nonstatutory expression through the judge-made habeas law
announced and refined by the Supreme Court.  The priorities are most visi-
ble in the various ways for state inmates to revive claims that were procedur-
ally defaulted during State PCR.  One way that state inmates can revive
otherwise forfeited claims is by showing that a failure to hear the claim would
constitute a “miscarriage of justice.”299  The miscarriage-of-justice gateway is
usually regarded as the gateway by which inmates revive claims associated
with innocence,300 but it is also used in capital cases to revive claims that a
294 See id. at 729.
295 See id. at 732.
296 See Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 301 (1989) (plurality opinion) (old law); id. at 311
(watershed rules).
297 Neither the general condition that the state decision be on the merits nor the sub-
sectional exceptions apply differently depending on the underlying claim. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254(d) (2012).
298 See, e.g., id. § 2254(b) (exhaustion rule); id. § 2254(d)(2) (statutory tolling). But see
id. § 2254(e)(2)(A)(i) (pegging availability of federal hearings for nondiligent claimants to
the announcement of a new and retroactive constitutional rule).
299 See House v. Bell, 547 U.S. 518, 536 (2006).
300 See, e.g., id. at 536–38 (explaining relationship between miscarriage-of-justice gate-
way and actual-innocence standard).
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state inmate is “actually innocent of the death penalty.”301  Such “death ineli-
gibility” claims, which invoke substantive constraints, usually take the familiar
form of Eighth Amendment exemptions involving attributes of the offender
or offense.302
If the miscarriage-of-justice gateway was the only mechanism for reviving
otherwise defaulted claims, then habeas intervention would represent a
harder-edged Exceptionalism.  There is, however, another gateway through
the otherwise-applicable bar to federal consideration of forfeited claims: the
so-called “cause-and-prejudice” rule.303  To satisfy the cause-and-prejudice
gateway, an inmate must show (1) that some external phenomenon pre-
vented state litigation of the claim (cause) and (2) some quantum of merit
(prejudice).304
Until fairly recently, the cause-and-prejudice doctrine had no substantive
valence because it did not privilege any particular type of constitutional chal-
lenge.  The cause-and-prejudice gateway always worked the same way, regard-
less of what the underlying constitutional claim was.  One of the most
important rules was that, without respect to the underlying constitutional
claim, the negligence of state postconviction counsel could not constitute
“cause.”305  Practically speaking, such a rule meant that mistakes of postcon-
viction lawyers were always attributed to clients and that they could never
provide a basis for reviving claims.
Perhaps the single most significant development in recent federal
habeas law involves a revision to this rule—the treatment of claims that were
forfeited because state postconviction counsel was negligent. Martinez v.
Ryan306 and Trevino v. Thaler307 represent attempts to ensure that state
inmates get at least one bite at the apple on IAC claims incapable of being
litigated during the direct-review chain or by an inadequate state postconvic-
tion lawyer.  Doctrinally, Martinez and Trevino exempt certain IAC claims
from the more general rule that a state inmate cannot use the negligence of
state postconviction counsel to satisfy the cause-and-prejudice gateway.308
The result of Martinez and Trevino is that habeas incentives target more than
just substantive constraints and innocence claims.  The Court-made habeas
intervention is designed to be particularly solicitous of Sixth Amendment
301 See Sawyer v. Whitley, 505 U.S. 333, 340 (1992).
302 Cf. Rocha v. Thaler, 626 F.3d 815, 826–27 (5th Cir. 2010) (specifying the different
types of Eighth Amendment claims that fall in under the miscarriage-of-justice gateway).
The Supreme Court has declined to answer whether the miscarriage-of-justice exception
applies to claims that a sentence was erroneously enhanced—a logical equivalent of a
death ineligibility claim—and has had no occasion to consider whether it extends to the
noncapital eligibility rules. See Dretke v. Haley, 541 U.S. 386, 388–89 (2004) (avoiding
question of how actual-innocence-of-death-penalty rule applied in noncapital scenario).
303 See Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 750 (1991).
304 See id.
305 See Edwards v. Carpenter, 529 U.S. 446, 451 (2000).
306 132 S. Ct. 1309 (2012).
307 133 S. Ct. 1911 (2013).
308 See id. at 1918; Martinez, 132 S. Ct. at 1315.
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claims, largely on the ground that, absent meaningful state postconviction
process, the procedural right would go unenforced.309
3. Resource Intervention
Substantive-Constraint Exceptionalism also suffuses resource interven-
tion.  Its influence on resource intervention does not appear to be the result
of conscious institutional design in the same way it is for constitutional and
habeas interventions.  It is nevertheless noteworthy that even if the federal
branches are not coordinating to implement a particular approach, the com-
plex institutional interaction nonetheless produces a set of legal rules
approximating more deliberate decisionmaking.
Some statutory background is necessary to understand how Exceptional-
ism affects resource intervention.  The Criminal Justice Act (CJA) is the col-
lection of federal statutory provisions, largely codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3006A,
ensuring legal representation of federal postconviction litigants.310  18 U.S.C.
§ 3599, which Congress “sp[un] off” from the CJA when it revived the federal
death penalty in 1988,311 is specific to death penalty cases, and requires fed-
eral habeas counsel to represent capitally sentenced inmates “in such compe-
tency proceedings . . . as may be available to the defendant.”312  The
competency proceedings that take place after the appointment of federal
habeas counsel, of course, are the means by which courts adjudicate Eighth
Amendment proportionality claims under Ford and Panetti.313  Eighth
Amendment competency challenges happen after the federal appointment
in death cases because, unlike many other challenges, a Ford challenge ripens
only after the state sets an execution date, which is usually after federal
habeas proceedings commence.
Resource intervention bears other substantial hallmarks of Substantive-
Constraint Exceptionalism.  Recall that the CJA provisions providing state
inmates access to federal lawyers and resources generally apply only after an
appointment is made in the initial federal proceeding.  That sequence neces-
sarily excludes the possibility that an inmate has such services and resources
made available before the federal habeas proceeding begins—when State PCR
usually takes place and considers procedural error.314  Instead, federal law-
309 See Martinez, 132 S. Ct. at 1315.
310 The CJA subdivides into a general provision for noncapital inmates, 18 U.S.C.
§ 3006A (2012), and a provision for capital inmates, id. § 3599.
311 See Martel v. Clair, 565 U.S. 648, 659 (2012).
312 18 U.S.C. § 3599(e).
313 See Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930 (2007); Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399
(1986).
314 See Harbison v. Bell, 556 U.S. 180, 189 (2009) (“State habeas is not a stage ‘subse-
quent’ to federal habeas.  Just the opposite: Petitioners must exhaust their claims in state
court before seeking federal habeas relief.”).
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yers and resources are available only for State PCR that happens to follow the
federal appointment.315
The priorities embedded in resource intervention therefore reflect the
types of claims that state inmates typically litigate in a successive posture,
which fall roughly into two buckets: “new facts” and “new law.”316  If a new
factual or legal basis of a claim materializes after a federal habeas appoint-
ment has been made, then the federal statute effectively permits the inmate
to use federal lawyers and resources to support the state postconviction activ-
ity necessary to support the litigation.317  “New facts” can be predicates for a
variety of constitutional challenges, but “new law” refers generally to new sub-
stantive constraints—particularly Eighth Amendment proportionality
decisions.
In short, the “new law” gateways for successive state postconviction litiga-
tion are largely gateways for litigating new substantive constraints,318 and suc-
cessive state postconviction litigation is the primary form of State PCR
supported through federal resources.319  When the Supreme Court recog-
nizes new substantive constraints on punishment, there will always be some
state enforcement activity that follows the federal habeas appointment.  Even
if the substantive constraint is capable of being applied prospectively by observ-
ing the rule in the direct-review chain, inmates whose convictions are final
will still have to enforce the rule collaterally.320
C. Exceptionalism and Dispersed Enforcement
On one view, Martinez and Trevino appear to complicate an otherwise
clear picture of Substantive-Constraint Exceptionalism.  On a better view,
softer-edged habeas intervention enriches it.  Through a process that I call
“dispersed enforcement,” the Supreme Court carefully limits its own role in
policing State PCR.  In Martinez, the Supreme Court actually rejected an inter-
vention that would have imposed a constitutional rule—enforceable by the
Court itself on appeal—that states provide postconviction counsel to litigate
viable Sixth Amendment claims.321  In some ways, then, the Martinez rule was
315 See id. at 190 n.7 (explaining that federal resources are available for state postconvic-
tion litigation because they are within § 3599(e)’s reference to “other appropriate motions
and procedures,” rather than its reference to “subsequent post-conviction” proceedings.).
316 See, e.g., TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 11.07, § 4(a)(1) (West 2017) (providing
for merits consideration for successive claims when “the factual or legal basis for the claim
was unavailable on the date the applicant filed the previous application”).
317 See Harbison, 556 U.S. at 190 n.7; Wilkins v. Davis, 832 F.3d 547, 557–58 (5th Cir.
2016) (holding that § 3599(e) entitles inmates to lawyers and ancillary services for the
purposes of state postconviction litigation that follows the federal appointment).
318 See, e.g., Nishi Kumar, Note, Cruel, Unusual, and Completely Backwards: An Argument for
Retroactive Application of the Eighth Amendment, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1331 (2015).
319 See, e.g., Sawyer v. Whitley, 505 U.S. 333 (1992).
320 See Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 308–09 (1989) (plurality opinion).
321 Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S. Ct. 1309, 1315 (2012).
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a way for the Court to avoid a more intrusive intervention, thereby reserving
such interventions for substantive constraints.
When understood as an alternative to a more intrusive intervention, the
rule of Martinez and Trevino is actually consistent with Substantive-Constraint
Exceptionalism.  Needing to enforce procedural constraints, the Justices
opted for intervention that minimized their own enforcement role, instead
dispersing it across the lower federal courts.  Rather than imposing a consti-
tutional rule that inmates are entitled to counsel during State PCR—a rule
the Supreme Court itself would have to enforce on direct review of state post-
conviction dispositions—the Court formulated a rule that entails no direct
interference with State PCR at all.  After Martinez and Trevino, states never
“have to” provide counsel in their postconviction proceedings; instead, they
choose between ensuring adequate counsel for inmates with substantial IAC
claims or permitting those claims to be considered de novo in a federal
habeas proceeding.
Martinez and Trevino therefore mark a familiar path in which the
Supreme Court, facing the prospect of a thick enforcement role, devised an
alternative.  In the 1950s and 1960s, when the Warren Court liberalized crim-
inal procedure through a series of cases announcing constitutional rights322
and incorporating them against the states,323 it also balked at the prospect of
direct appellate enforcement.  Instead, it deputized lower federal courts to
enforce the new suite of procedural constraints by activating the habeas rem-
322 See, e.g., Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 302 (1967) (acknowledging general rule
barring use of out-of-court identification based on unnecessarily suggestive identification
procedure, but allowing out-of-court identification in this case based on the totality of the
circumstances); United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 228–39 (1967) (requiring that defen-
dant have counsel at postindictment lineup); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467 (1966)
(holding that the Fifth Amendment requires that suspects be warned prior to custodial
interrogation); Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 615 (1965) (announcing that the Fifth
Amendment “forbids either comment by the prosecution on the accused’s silence or
instructions by the court that such silence is evidence of guilt”); Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S.
400, 407–08 (1965) (recognizing a defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to confront and
cross-examine trial witnesses); Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201, 207 (1964) (impos-
ing a Sixth Amendment bar against using incriminating statements that law enforcement
deliberately elicited after indictment and in counsel’s absence); Brady v. Maryland, 373
U.S. 83, 87 (1963) (announcing prosecutors’ duty to disclose exculpatory evidence); Doug-
las v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 357–58 (1963) (entitling an indigent defendant to
appointed counsel during any mandatory state appeal); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12,
18–19 (1956) (plurality opinion) (giving indigent defendants rights to free trial transcripts
to ensure adequate appellate consideration).
323 See, e.g., Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 159–62 (1968) (Sixth Amendment jury
trial right in nonpetty criminal cases); Pointer, 380 U.S. at 403 (Sixth Amendment confron-
tation clause right); Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 111 (1964) (Fourth Amendment war-
rant requirement), abrogated on other grounds by Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983); Malloy
v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 6 (1964) (Fifth Amendment protection applicable to the states);
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 340, 342–44 (1963) (Sixth Amendment right to coun-
sel in all felony cases); Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 667–68 (1962) (Eighth
Amendment cruel and unusual punishments clause); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 653
(1961) (Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule).
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edy.324 Martinez and Trevino represent a similar dispersion strategy.  Consti-
tutional-law intervention is thereby reserved only for the maximally
manageable category of claims based on substantive-law constraints.
V. EVALUATING SUBSTANTIVE-CONSTRAINT EXCEPTIONALISM
In Part V, I offer my assessment of Substantive-Constraint Exceptional-
ism, which is more capably defended as an administrative compromise than
as a series of otherwise-principled distinctions between lawful and unlawful
punishment.  My position is not that there is no meaningful distinction
between substantive and procedural constraints, but that the pro-Exception-
alism narrative has failed to justify why the particular laws in question turn on
those distinctions.
The most self-conscious defense of Substantive-Constraint Exceptional-
ism is the Supreme Court’s opinion in Montgomery v. Louisiana,325 which held
(among other things) that the substantive-law exception to the federal retro-
activity framework applies in State PCR.326  Whatever the administrative
merit of Exceptionalism, Montgomery’s bedrock premise—that convictions in
violation of an Eighth Amendment proportionality rule are “unlawful” and
convictions in violation of other constitutional provisions are not327—draws
little support from penal theory or prior doctrine.
A. The Administrative Justification
Perhaps the strongest argument in favor of Substantive-Constraint
Exceptionalism is the least inspirational: it is easily administered.  Among the
category of claims requiring a collateral forum for effective enforcement,
substantive constraints are uniquely suited to relatively efficient litigation and
disposition.  This efficiency comes from two sources.  First, the number of
cases touched by substantive constraints is sufficiently small that exceptions
do not affect much state postconviction litigation.328  Second, the social
resources necessary to litigate and decide substantive constraints in individ-
ual cases are less than those necessary to dispose of other constitutional
challenges.
The first feature of Exceptionalism’s administrative appeal involves the
relatively small size of postconviction terrain it covers.  The federal interven-
tions involving retroactivity, the processing of Ford claims, and the availability
324 See Erwin Chemerinsky & Larry Kramer, Defining the Role of the Federal Courts, 1990
BYU L. REV. 67, 87 (“Less obviously, federal courts perform an essentially appellate func-
tion in reviewing petitions for writs of habeas corpus from state prisoners.”); Barry Fried-
man, A Tale of Two Habeas, 73 MINN. L. REV. 247, 254 (1988) (“Accordingly, the federal
habeas courts were to act as surrogates for the United States Supreme Court through
habeas review, in effect exercising appellate jurisdiction over state criminal proceedings.”).
325 136 S. Ct. 718 (2016).
326 See id. at 727–32.
327 See id. at 729–30.
328 See, e.g., STEIKER & STEIKER, supra note 5, at 164.
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of resources for state postconviction litigation following the appointment of a
federal habeas lawyer all facilitate litigation of substantive constraints that are
primarily Eighth Amendment proportionality claims.
The existing list of Eighth Amendment proportionality rules is small and
touches few state convictions.  Moreover, they generally involve the death
penalty or, more recently, LWOP.  As far as offenders are concerned, death
sentences cannot be imposed on those who are insane or intellectually dis-
abled,329 or who were juveniles at the time they committed an offense.330
Nor can juvenile offenders receive mandatory LWOP.331  In terms of offenses,
the death penalty can be imposed only for certain crimes against the state
(such as treason) and for killings in which the offender actually murdered
the victim or exhibited reckless indifference to human life or had substantial
involvement in a felony that resulted in a killing.332  When the substantive
constraint arises from a federal constitutional provision other than the
Eighth Amendment—something like a First Amendment decision invalidat-
ing a specific criminal provision as overbroad333—there is a similarly limited
impact of such a holding in terms of the number of inmates affected.
For all of the existing substantive constraints, there is no pressing neces-
sity for a postconviction forum, at least in the sense that those exemptions
can be applied prospectively in the direct-review chain.  Trial and appellate
courts apply the substantive constraint by simply refusing certain penalty-
offender-offense combinations.  Collateral enforcement of these types of sub-
stantive constraints is largely an exercise in relitigating a direct-review deter-
mination.  The only exception to this generalization is a Ford claim, which
centers on a present state of mental health that is definitionally incapable of
being adjudicated until an execution date approaches.334
Other than Ford claims, substantive constraints that require meaningful
collateral enforcement are new constraints.  In other words, State PCR
enforcement is crucial when the Supreme Court announces a new substan-
tive constraint that applies retroactively.  In such situations, the constraint
could not have been applied in the direct-review chain.  For example, in the
immediate aftermath of the Atkins decision, which announced the retroactive
Eighth Amendment exemption for intellectually disabled offenders,335 col-
lateral proceedings were necessary to enforce the rights of inmates whose
convictions were already final.
The second reason why substantive constraints are especially suited to
State PCR intervention involves the incremental cost of producing reliable
329 See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002) (intellectual disability); Ford v. Wain-
wright, 477 U.S. 399, 401 (1986) (insanity).
330 See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578–79 (2005).
331 See Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 465 (2012).
332 See Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 158 (1987).
333 See generally Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Making Sense of Overbreadth, 100 YALE L.J. 853
(1991) (analyzing how overbreadth rulings interact with criminal punishment).
334 See supra notes 46–52 and accompanying text.
335 See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002).
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outcomes in the incremental pieces of litigation.  Virtually any constitutional chal-
lenge requires proof of some predicate fact—for example, an inmate with an
Atkins claim must prove intellectual disability,336 an inmate claiming an
exemption from juvenile LWOP must prove her age,337 and an inmate with a
Sixth Amendment IAC claim must prove a prejudicial deficiency of the trial
attorney.338
For at least some substantive constraints, the incremental cost of reliably
enforcing the substantive constraint is far less than the cost of producing
reliable outcomes in challenges involving procedural rules.  The reason, in
many cases, involves the incremental cost of litigating the factual predicate of
the claim.  For Eighth Amendment rules involving the qualities of the
offense, there may be little more than a glance at the conviction and the
sentence itself.  After Kennedy v. Louisiana339—which held that states could
not execute offenders convicted of crimes other than murder340—there was
very little litigation over facts necessary to apply the exemption.  An inmate
was either sentenced to death for a murder or not; courts needed no experts
to figure that information out.  The same logic goes for convictions under a
statute declared to be overbroad under the First Amendment.  The major
information that any court requires to apply the constraint is simply the judg-
ment of conviction, which will disclose the offense for which an inmate has
been punished.
For exemptions involving offender attributes, there are also situations
where the incremental social cost of processing the claim is relatively low.
For example, after Roper established that juveniles were ineligible for the
death penalty,341 litigation over the juvenile status of qualifying offenders was
unlikely to impose a particularly taxing burden on the system.  The same is
true after Miller announced the Eighth Amendment prohibition on
mandatory LWOP for juveniles.342  For these offender-based exemptions and
others like them, the incremental costs of processing the constitutional claim
are negligible.  In the same way that courts required no expert to tell them
whether an inmate was convicted of murder or not, they required little help
in reading a birth certificate.
Of course, it is true that there are certain substantive constraints for
which per-claim adjudication costs are higher.  For example, proving an
inmate’s entitlement to an Atkins exemption (intellectual disability) will
often require extensive psychometric and behavioral testing,343 as well as an
investigation into family histories and conditions during the developmental
336 See supra notes 53–59 and accompanying text.
337 See supra notes 212–213 and accompanying text.
338 See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984).
339 554 U.S. 407 (2008).
340 See id. at 421.
341 Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578 (2005).
342 Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 465 (2012).
343 See, e.g., Hall v. Florida, 134 S. Ct. 1986, 1993–2001 (2014) (discussing treatment of
IQ testing in Atkins litigation).
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period.344  Moreover, much of the proof offered by the inmate—for exam-
ple, an IQ score—will ordinarily be contested by the State.  As a result, the
social costs associated with developing, litigating, and resolving Atkins claims
can be substantial.345
Generally speaking, however, Substantive-Constraint Exceptionalism is
particularly appealing to federal institutions because it is particularly easy to
administer.  The lower case volume and per-case cost means that intervention
consumes fewer state and federal resources from courts, state prosecutors,
defense attorneys, and inmates.
B. The Montgomery Justification
Although the administrative justification likely exerts real influence on
its Exceptionalism and its enforcement dispersion, the Supreme Court
aspires to a more principled distinction for its treatment of substantive con-
straints.  Its most energized articulation appears in Montgomery v. Louisi-
ana,346 where the Court determined that Miller v. Alabama’s rule against
imposing mandatory LWOP on juvenile offenders was a new but retroactive
rule of substantive law.347  I explore the Montgomery rationale below, but its
gist is the problematic idea that a sentence violating a substantive constraint
is “unlawful” and that a sentence violating some other constitutional provi-
sion is not.  If the Supreme Court cannot use the concept of substantive con-
straints to draw a persuasive line between lawful and unlawful convictions,
however, the pro-Exceptionalism narrative begins to fall apart.
Montgomery did not arise in the ordinary federal habeas posture in which
the Supreme Court considers retroactivity questions.  The Court heard the
case on review of a state postconviction disposition348 and the Louisiana
Supreme Court had determined that state law withheld retroactive effect.349
Such a holding appeared to be a state ground for deciding against the
inmate, in which case the Court would lack appellate jurisdiction over the
rest of the case.350  The Court dealt with Montgomery’s jurisdictionally disrup-
344 See Richard J. Bonnie & Katherine Gustafson, The Challenge of Implementing Atkins v.
Virginia: How Legislatures and Courts Can Promote Accurate Assessments and Adjudications of
Mental Retardation in Death Penalty Cases, 41 U. RICH. L. REV. 811, 855 (2007).
345 It is true that death penalty proceedings are substantially more expensive than post-
conviction claims involving noncapital sentences, and that many substantive constraints are
restrictions on death sentencing.  That the average postconviction cost of litigating a death
sentence exceeds the average postconviction cost of litigating a noncapital sentence, how-
ever, does not change my observation about the incremental cost of enforcing a substantive
constraint through a single claim.
346 136 S. Ct. 718 (2016).
347 Id. at 734; see Miller, 567 U.S. 460.
348 See Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 726.
349 See id. at 727.
350 See generally Kermit Roosevelt III, Essay, Light from Dead Stars: The Procedural Adequate
and Independent State Ground Reconsidered, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1888 (2003) (exploring the
difference between “substantive” and “procedural” independence).
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tive retroactivity issue by declaring it to be a question of federal law,351
thereby facilitating constitutional-law intervention.
In order to understand why Montgomery’s pro-Exceptionalism narrative
flounders, it is important to know a little bit more about retroactivity rules.
Three types of Supreme Court decisions get retroactive effect under Teague
v. Lane: “old law” that is dictated by precedent (which is not new law and is
not covered by the Teague bar), “new” substantive law (the first Teague excep-
tion), and “watershed” procedure (the second). Montgomery changed two
things about the existing understanding of retroactivity law.  First, it posited
some meaningful difference between new “substantive law” and Court deci-
sions that might be retroactive for other reasons.  Second, at least the sub-
stantive-law rule is of a constitutional order.
The Supreme Court explained: “Where state collateral review proceed-
ings permit prisoners to challenge the lawfulness of their confinement, States
cannot refuse to give retroactive effect to a substantive constitutional right
that determines the outcome of that challenge.”352  The Court declared that
any conviction inconsistent with a subsequently announced substantive rule
is unlawful353 and that the Constitution requires that states discharge any
inmate incarcerated unlawfully, under that scenario.354  The substantive rule
permitting mandatory LWOP sentencing for juveniles was “unlawful,” accord-
ing to Montgomery, because “a State enforces a proscription or penalty barred
by the Constitution.”355  The Court contrasted such sentences with those
tainted by constitutional error that was procedural, which apparently did not
render the sentence “unlawful” because the defendant was still eligible for
the sentence.356
On the premise that only sentences inconsistent with new substantive
rules are “unlawful,” the Supreme Court announced that the Constitution
requires states to apply only the corresponding part of the Teague retroactiv-
ity framework.357  The Court did not decide whether the federal retroactivity
rule had to be applied for claims invoking watershed procedural decisions, or
new decisions on old laws.358  Underneath the complex doctrinal discussion
in Montgomery is the basic proposition that a penalty levied by way of constitu-
tional error is “lawful” as long as the inmate was in some formal sense eligible
for the sentence.  This proposition is deeply problematic for at least two dis-
tinct reasons.  First, the Court used the Eighth Amendment to fabricate a
new and counterintuitive line between lawful and unlawful convictions.  Sec-
ond, the Court presented that line as one drawn by constitutional necessity.
351 See Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 729.
352 Id. at 731–32.
353 See id. at 729–30.
354 See id. at 731.
355 Id. at 729–30.
356 Id. at 730.
357 Id. at 729.
358 Id.
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First, the premise that sentences and convictions in violation of substan-
tive constraints are “unlawful,” whereas sentences and convictions inconsis-
tent with procedural rules are not, flies in the face of some pretty basic ideas
about the authority of the State to punish defendants.  An offender can be
unlawfully convicted if she is guilty, and may be unlawfully sentenced not-
withstanding her formal eligibility for the penalty.  If law enforcement forces
a guilty defendant to confess at gunpoint and that confession is the disposi-
tive evidence of guilt, for example, the conviction is still “unlawful.”  The
touchstone of “lawfulness” is not innocence or eligibility.  The question is
whether the process for assigning guilt and fixing a penalty represents a legit-
imate exercise of state power.359  An Eighth Amendment violation is suffi-
cient for a conviction or sentence to be unlawful, but it is not necessary.  The
truth of the proposition that sentences inconsistent with substantive rules are
not lawful does not establish that sentences consistent with them are.
Montgomery therefore conflates two distinct concepts: the set of unlawful
punishments susceptible to collateral invalidation is not the same as the set of
unlawful punishments.360  It is true that only a limited set of constitutional
infirmities permit a court to collaterally invalidate punishment, but that limi-
tation does not reflect the view that only punishment inconsistent with sub-
stantive rules is unlawful.  To suggest that only punishment in violation of a
substantive rule is unlawful is to ignore a mountain of early-to-mid-twentieth
century precedent about the relationship between the Due Process Clause
and the viability of collateral challenges to state convictions.361  There is
nothing unusual about the proposition that only certain types of unlawful
punishments are subject to collateral relief.  Indeed, that proposition is at the
very heart of Ex parte Siebold,362 the crucial precedent recited in Montgomery
itself.363
Second, Montgomery commits another serious mistake when it confuses a
statutory remedy for constitutional violations with a constitutional rule that
such a remedy be made available.  The authority Montgomery discusses—espe-
359 See Alice Ristroph, Regulation or Resistance? A Counter-Narrative of Constitutional Crimi-
nal Procedure, 95 B.U. L. REV. 1555, 1598 (2015); Nirej Sekhon, Willing Suspects and Docile
Defendants: The Contradictory Role of Consent in Criminal Procedure, 46 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV.
103, 121, 131 (2011).
360 Montgomery explains that because a punishment tainted by procedural error might
still be lawful, “a trial conducted under a procedure found to be unconstitutional in a later
case does not, as a general matter, have the automatic consequence of invalidating a defen-
dant’s conviction or sentence.”  136 S. Ct. at 730.
361 See, e.g., Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86, 89–90 (1923) (establishing that due pro-
cess violations rendered convictions void).  In Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443 (1953), the
Supreme Court eventually embraced the notion that convictions could be invalid because
of due process violations—including violations occurring by way of constitutional provi-
sions incorporated through the Fourteenth Amendment. See Daniels v. Allen, decided sub
nom. Brown, 344 U.S. at 488–513 (1953) (opinion of Frankfurter, J.).
362 100 U.S. 371 (1879).
363 See Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 730–32.
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cially Siebold itself—interprets the federal habeas statute.364  The Judiciary Act
of 1789 provided a statutory habeas remedy and the Habeas Corpus Act of
1867 made it available to state inmates confined in violation of the Constitu-
tion.365  The question at issue in the operative precedent was whether a con-
viction under an unconstitutional statute entitled the aggrieved inmate to
federal habeas relief under that statute.  The proposition affirmed in the pre-
cedent—that such convictions were void and therefore triggered discharge
under the statutory remedy366—is not equivalent to the proposition that the
Constitution itself requires discharge.367 Montgomery reads as though the
Supreme Court is oblivious to Siebold’s clear meaning.  Instead of reporting
Siebold as a case interpreting the statutory habeas remedy to reach particular
types of defects, the Court reinterprets it as support for the idea that the
Constitution requires the remedy.
There are more oddities about Montgomery’s reliance on Siebold. Siebold
is a single precedent in a long line of cases about what types of criminal
judgments are “unlawful.”368  It is neither a starting nor end point on that
364 Specifically, Siebold was an interpretation of the Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 14, 1
Stat. 73, 81–82, which granted the Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction to issue original
habeas writs to lower federal courts.  The operative question in Siebold was, in light of the fact
that there was an express grant of statutory jurisdiction, whether there was something inherent
in the nature of the writ that precluded review of the inferior court judgment. See Paul M.
Bator, Finality in Criminal Law and Federal Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners, 76 HARV. L. REV.
441, 468 n.59 (1963).
365 See Act of Feb. 5, 1867, ch. 28, § 1, 14 Stat. 385 (establishing by statute the availabil-
ity of habeas relief for state prisoners); Ex parte Dorr, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 103, 104–05 (1845)
(explaining that the 1789 Act did not reach state custody).
366 Just Scalia was explaining the distinction between a statutory and a constitutional
rule when he wrote, “It is a decision about this Court’s statutory power to grant the Origi-
nal Writ, not about its constitutional obligation to do so.  Nowhere in Siebold did this Court
intimate that relief was constitutionally required . . . .” Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 740
(Scalia, J., dissenting).  Justice Scalia, however, fails to provide any explanation along the
lines of that provided supra note 364, which more clearly conveys what Siebold was deciding.
367 The Supreme Court declared: “A penalty imposed pursuant to an unconstitutional
law is no less void because the prisoner’s sentence became final before the law was held
unconstitutional. There is no grandfather clause that permits States to enforce punish-
ments the Constitution forbids.” Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 731.  Whatever that argument’s
abstract appeal, the entire theory of retroactivity jurisprudence is built on the idea that
some convictions will be in violation of law but lack a remedy. See generally Fallon & Melt-
zer, supra note 80 (setting forth the canonical argument).
368 Siebold was preceded by two other cases that began to expand the definition of
“unlawful custody” beyond a conviction imposed by a court without jurisdiction. See Ex
parte Parks, 93 U.S. 18, 21 (1876) (emphasizing that the court had no power to correct
“mere error”); Ex parte Lange, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 163, 177–78 (1873) (in the context of a
double-jeopardy violation, rejecting proposition that a judgment imposed by a jurisdiction-
ally competent court is necessarily lawful).  The Court subsequently held that a major due
process violation could render a conviction unlawful, see Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86
(1923), and the Court positioned Moore as a major reason for the result in Brown v. Allen,
344 U.S. 443 (1953), which is discussed supra note 361.  No matter what side of the histori-
cal debate academics take, none appear to believe that Siebold represents an endpoint for
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\93-2\NDL201.txt unknown Seq: 52 28-DEC-17 9:53
494 notre dame law review [vol. 93:2
line, so the selective emphasis on that case seems arbitrary.  Subsequent
cases—cases far more frequently cited as authoritative on the conditions for
unlawful punishments—embrace the idea that unlawful punishment is a
much broader category than the concept contemplated in Siebold.369
Why make mistakes that are so obvious?  The answer might be that these
were not mistakes.  The Court wanted to hold that it always intervened but only
intervened when custody was unlawful, and doing so required it to use the
Eighth Amendment to redraw the line between lawful and unlawful convic-
tions. Siebold’s language about the lawfulness of the conviction, wrenched
from its context, suggested that the Constitution—not any statute—required
some form of retroactivity for attacks on certain types of punishments.370  It
also suggests a limitation on the idea of unlawful punishment, which
excludes punishment violating procedural rules.  Combining these two pro-
positions is what allowed the Court to assume appellate jurisdiction in the
case without, in the Court’s view, imposing too extravagant an obligation on
states.  Louisiana’s decision not to apply Miller’s Eighth Amendment rule ret-
roactively was positioned as a constitutional violation (and therefore a federal
issue), but the constitutional rule reached no further than Teague’s substan-
tive-rule category.  By constitutionalizing what amounts to a substantive-con-
straint exception to retroactivity, the Court simultaneously promoted the
Eighth Amendment interest and preserved the administrability of its
intervention.
Distorting precedent is the jaywalking of interpretive sins, but Montgom-
ery’s collateral damage is significant.  As explained above, Montgomery appears
to embrace the radical proposition that a conviction is never unlawful unless
substantive law bars a penalty for an offense.  Punishment secured in viola-
tion of double jeopardy rules, by mob-dominated trials, and through
prosecutorial misconduct are all declared by Montgomery to be in some
unspecified sense “lawful.”  Of course, not every minor error of criminal pro-
the meaning of “lawful custody.” Compare, e.g., Bator, supra note 364, at 463–99 (restrictive
view of precedent), with Gary Peller, In Defense of Federal Habeas Corpus Relitigation, 16 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 579, 604–63 (1982) (expansive view of precedent).
369 See, e.g., Waley v. Johnston, 316 U.S. 101, 104 (1942) (per curiam) (permitting relief
on a coerced confession claim because “petitioner’s constitutional rights were infringed”);
Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 467–68 (1938) (voiding a conviction on the violation of
the right to counsel); Moore, 261 U.S. at 90–91 (holding that a due process violation voided
a conviction).
370 The proposition that retroactivity rules were something other than subconstitu-
tional restraints on the federal habeas remedy was, notwithstanding Montgomery’s lengthy
suggestion to the contrary, completely novel.  The Court sometimes positioned the retroac-
tivity rule as something like federal common law, and other times positioned it as an inter-
pretation of the federal habeas statute. See, e.g., Danforth v. Minnesota, 552 U.S. 264, 278
(2008) (“Teague’s general rule of nonretroactivity was an exercise of this Court’s power to
interpret the federal habeas statute.”); Zarrow & Milliken, supra note 267, at 955–64 (ana-
lyzing the Court’s substantive-rule retroactivity doctrine as a common-law phenomenon).
The Montgomery Court brushed aside prior cases operating under such an assumption as
dicta—including foundational language from Teague—because Teague, it explained, “is
best understood as resting upon constitutional premises.” Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 729.
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cedure contaminates punishment such that it is open to collateral challenge,
but there was already a device built into retroactivity law that performed the
necessary sorting function—only watershed rules of criminal procedure were
retroactively enforced.371
The other Montgomery revelation is the rule that the Teague framework—
at least the substantive-rule exception—is a creature of constitutional law.  If
taken seriously, this piece of Montgomery would plunge much of modern post-
conviction law—both state and federal—into a state of profound uncertainty.
If punishments in violation of substantive constraints are unlawful and the
constitution requires government to permit collateral attacks in such cases,
how can any statutory restrictions on such attacks survive? Montgomery
appears to have had a blinkered focus on retroactivity rules in State PCR, but
a constitutional rule is a constitutional rule, and it applies everywhere.
A rule that no court can enforce a punishment inconsistent with a sub-
stantive constraint would blow holes through a raft of federal restrictions on
the habeas remedy.  What, for example, is the status of the 28 U.S.C.
§ 2244(b)(2) restriction that limits successive habeas claims to those involv-
ing guilt questions, rather than eligibility for a punishment?372  Could a fed-
eral court impose a time-bar on Eighth Amendment claims if the
Constitution requires a discharge remedy?373
There are, of course, very meaningful differences between punishment
that violates substantive constraints and punishment secured by way of a pro-
cedural violation.  The problem is that the difference between substantive
and procedural error has never mattered all that much to the law of judg-
ments (when they involve property),374 or to habeas law (when they involve
liberty).375  And although habeas law might have permitted enhanced collat-
eral consideration of convictions in violation of substantive constraints, simi-
larly enhanced consideration has always been available for punishment
imposed by way of procedural defects.376
If the Supreme Court simply needed a response to the unique injustice
of custody in violation of substantive constraints, it had much better tools in
its toolbox.  There were ways to ensure that qualifying juveniles got the bene-
fit of Miller without the disruptive language the Supreme Court used to fash-
ion the constitutional-law intervention.  The Court, for example, could have
held that the state nonretroactivity ground was “inadequate” to ensure pro-
371 See Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 311 (1989) (plurality opinion).
372 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2)(B) (2012) provides that new-fact petitions cannot proceed
unless “no reasonable factfinder would have found the applicant guilty of the underlying
offense.”
373 The federal limitations statute applicable to state-inmate claims appears in 28 U.S.C.
§ 2244(d).
374 Indeed, civil judgments are voidable if process in the rendering jurisdiction does not
satisfy constitutional standards. See Kovarsky, supra note 124, at 643–45.
375 See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(C) (describing scenario in which state inmates are
foreclosed from federal habeas consideration in cases of a violated substantive constraint).
376 See id. § 2254(a) (extending the habeas remedy to all “in custody in violation of the
Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States”).
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tection of the substantive federal right, thereby permitting unfettered
Supreme Court and federal habeas review of the state decision.377  Or it
could have accomplished that result by holding that the state nonretroactivity
ground was insufficiently “independent” of federal law.378  Or the Court
could have applied the whole retroactivity framework to State PCR, without
equating the concept of an unlawful sentence with the concept of an actually
innocent defendant.  The latter solution would still confound some prece-
dent, but it would not require the Court to improvise new and disruptive
theories about when a conviction is lawful and the source of a postconviction
remedy.379
C. The Regulatory Efficacy of Dispersed Enforcement
A final (albeit secondary) criticism of the Exceptionalism model is that
its dispersed-enforcement mechanism does little to improve what one might
call states’ postconviction hygiene.  Specifically, Martinez and Trevino lack reg-
ulatory bite insofar as they are unlikely to alter the way states guarantee legal
services to postconviction claimants.  The doctrinal modifications treat the
symptoms more than the disease; they deal with the effects of defective state
postconviction representation by ensuring the availability of a federal forum,
but the availability of that forum does not necessarily incentivize states to
change much about the State PCR that they provide.
Before I discuss this particular problem, readers should understand that
not every Justice voting for Supreme Court relief in Martinez and Trevino did
so with the regulatory objective of reforming state postconviction practice.
Nonetheless, the Justices were surely aware of the fact that federal habeas law
might have such institutional effects.  Indeed, the Martinez Justices were not
making a binary choice between judgment for the inmate or the state; they
were also choosing between whether to provide the equitable remedy that
Martinez ultimately endorsed or to declare a narrow constitutional right to
postconviction counsel that would have forced institutional change much
377 See generally Daniel J. Meltzer, State Court Forfeitures of Federal Rights, 99 HARV. L. REV.
1128, 1137–45 (1986) (describing four different categories of inadequate state procedural
rules); Catherine T. Struve, Direct and Collateral Federal Court Review of the Adequacy of State
Procedural Rules, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 243, 250–77 (2003) (developing a “Taxonomy of
Adequacy”).
378 See generally PETER W. LOW ET AL., 2017 SUPPLEMENT TO FEDERAL COURTS AND THE
LAW OF FEDERAL-STATE RELATIONS 5–7 (8th ed. 2017) (explaining decisional basis for such
a holding).
379 I am largely concerned with Montgomery’s legal rule, but worth mentioning are the
issues with Miller as a vehicle for declaring the constitutional requirement that substantive
rules apply retroactively. Miller is not (as it is sometimes described) a rule against juvenile
LWOP; it is a rule against mandatory juvenile LWOP.  567 U.S. 460, 465 (2012).  Life with-
out parole can still be imposed on juveniles; the sentencing must simply include individual-
ized consideration. See id. Montgomery contemplates categorical rules against certain types
of punishments for certain types of crime irrespective of procedure, and rules against
mandatory imposition of otherwise permissible punishment do not fit comfortably within
that framework.
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more directly.380  The point I want to make is that the theoretical justifica-
tion for the equilibrium—whether that equilibrium was a conscious objective
or a predictable byproduct of judicial decisionmaking—is lacking.
Understanding the empirical effect of Martinez and Trevino on adminis-
tration of State PCR is difficult in light of available data.  What little data
there is, however, suggests that Martinez and Trevino are unlikely to substan-
tially affect the volume of filing or hearing activity, or the provision of coun-
sel.381  The feedback loop, it seems, is just too attenuated.  The institutional
entities responsible for supplying representation during State PCR would
have to conclude that, in light of the Martinez excuse, benefits exceed costs.
Such a conclusion would require the entities—usually judges—to believe that
a failure to appoint counsel would result in more federal decisions granting
habeas relief, and that the costs of such unlikely relief (in the form of retri-
als) would exceed the cost of appointed counsel in State PCR.382  Moreover,
to the extent that state judges are concerned about the costs of federal
habeas relief on Sixth Amendment claims, there are lower-cost responses
than effectively enforcing a right to counsel in State PCR.383
All of this is to say that although Martinez and Trevino might be habeas
interventions designed to redress Sixth Amendment violations, they do not
necessarily function as a regulatory device that improves State PCR.  States
are unlikely to respond to the newly available federal forum by altering the
institutional configuration of their postconviction processes.  If the Supreme
Court had the appetite to enforce it, the more effective regulatory tactic
would be to include the Sixth Amendment in the suite of constitutional pro-
tections the Court was willing to protect using constitutional-law interven-
tion.  Instead, such interventions are reserved for substantive constraints.
CONCLUSION
The body of procedure that a community uses to punish lawbreakers will
always have the criminal trial as its spine.  Legal institutions nonetheless seem
to recognize that the era of near-exclusive focus on the trial has ended.  At
the same time, and to borrow a basic economic concept, demand for post-
conviction process is increasing at the very moment that supply is falling—
when federal habeas review becomes less and less viable as a means of enforc-
ing federal rights.  In light of these developments, federal institutions (prima-
rily the judiciary) have devised intervention to ensure that State PCR more
effectively secures the federal interests at stake in those proceedings.
That intervention increasingly discloses a Substantive-Constraint Excep-
tionalism that deprioritizes redress for other types of constitutional viola-
380 See Brief of Former State Supreme Court Justices as Amici Curiae in Support of
Petitioner at 7, Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S. Ct. 1309 (2012) (No. 10-1001), 2011 WL 4427080.
381 See generally King, supra note 4, at 2449–55 (explaining the limited effect that Marti-
nez and Trevino will have on the state postconviction process).
382 See id. at 2451.
383 See id. at 2451–52 (collecting potential alternative responses).
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tions.  Specifically, the most aggressive mode of intervention—direct review
of state postconviction dispositions—is reserved exclusively for substantive
constraints.  The less aggressive modes of intervention, which do exhibit a
growing focus on Sixth Amendment issues, are an exercise in what I call dis-
persed enforcement.  The Supreme Court effectively offloads enforcement
responsibility to the lower federal courts.
The justifications for such Exceptionalism are middling, and are less
conceptual and doctrinal than they are administrative.  There may be some-
thing unique about substantive constraints, but the Supreme Court’s attempt
to isolate them by suggesting that they define the universe of “unlawful pun-
ishment” is both unpersuasive and a little careless.  The more intuitive but
less emotionally stirring explanation is that review of punishment that vio-
lates substantive constraints is uniquely administrable.
